Inference or interaction: social cognition without precursors

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Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds (2012, background): “Drawing upon the classical phenomenological discussions, a number of contemporary theorists have recently defended a similar DP view of social cognition (Gallagher 2008; Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Gallagher and Zahavi 2008; cf. Hobson 2008, Reddy 2008).”
The interactive brain hypothesis (2012, background): “…since it is clear that the same evidence can equally be interpreted in IBH terms, perhaps even more parsimoniously as there is no experiential evidence that stimuli directed to the self are accompanied by guesses about their meaning and “mental state” attributions (Gallagher, 2008b, in press).”
Making enactivism even more embodied (2014, background): “This view is usually worked out in contrast to theory of mind (ToM) approaches that emphasize mindreading by either theoretical inference or simulation (Gallagher 2001; 2005; 2008).”
Two problems of intersubjectivity (2009, background): “This is especially tied to the way that I characterize direct perception in the context of social cognition (Gallagher, 2008b).”