A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups

By Heitor Almeida, Daniel Wolfenzon. 2005

856 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e7fd4cc5550046ffeb96e2a21a13edabb8a51b35

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Citations in the corpus

Family Firms and Debt: Risk Aversion versus Risk of Losing Control (2013, background): “Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide formal models consistent with the observation of low wedge measurements across family business groups with pyramidal ownership structures.”
Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis (2014, positive): “Recent literature on business groups also suggests that comparing profitability across group and non-group firms is unwarranted, because profitability is one of the key variables that determines whether an independent firm is likely to be acquired by a business group (see for example Almeida et al.(”
The Structure and Formation of Business Groups: Evidence from Korean Chaebols (2011, methodology): “Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) present a model of pyramidal ownership that does not rely on separation between ownership and control.”
Exit Strategies in Family Firms: How Socioemotional Wealth Drives the Threshold of Performance (2013, neutral): “…(see Carter & Ram, 2003), family owners may behave very much like a traditional investor (e.g., a venture capitalist) wherein profit 1306 ENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY and PRACTICE and value maximization (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Iacobucci & Rosa, 2010; Ram, 1994)—not emotions—determine behavior.”
The Adolescence of Family Firm Research (2012, background): “These groups are sometimes viewed as quasi-capital markets that can share risk (Khanna & Yafeh, 2005) and allocate credit to affiliated firms (Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006).”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, positive): “In addition to these arguments, prior theory (e.g., Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006) and evidence (e.g., Attig et al. 2006; Boubakri et al. 2010; Claessens et al. 2002) shows that family-controlled firms are associated with more pronounced agency costs.”
The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, positive): “, where institutions provide minority shareholders less protection and hence expropriation is more likely to take place among family firms (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).”
Earnings Management within Multinational Corporations (2018, background): “For example, North American MNCs having only 12.4% of their subsidiaries domiciled in North American countries might also reflect the limited availability of financial statement data for private U.S. firms. effect of both income-increasing and income-decreasing reporting choices.”
How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled (2009, neutral): “Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) provide a rationale for the use of pyramids that differs from the agency argument in Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) and others.”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Almeida & Wolfenzon (2006) and Masulis et al. (2009) examine the special case of pyramidal business groups.”
Beyond institutional voids: Business groups, incomplete markets, and organizational form (2015, background): “for “bad causes,” harder and costlier (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Belenzon and Berkovitz, 2010).”