The Structure and Formation of Business Groups: Evidence from Korean Chaebols

By Heitor Almeida, Sang Yong Park, Marti G. Subrahmanyam, Daniel Wolfenzon. 2011

315 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/110317a0aca27228cf50751096d6bff66921f091

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Citations in the corpus

The Life Cycle of Family Ownership: International Evidence (2012, background): “…Van Reenen (2007), who study management practices in 732 private manufacturing firms in the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom; Almeida et al. (2011), who analyze ultimate ownership for both private and listed firms in Korean chaebol groups; and Giannetti (2003) studies the…”
Business group affiliation, ownership structure, and the cost of debt (2013, methodology): “In contrast, group affiliation will imply less benefit for firms used by the family to control other group firms (i.e., central firms) than non-central firms because central firms are likely used to support weak member firms in financial trouble (Almeida et al., 2011).”
Family Business Groups around the World: Financing Advantages, Control Motivations and Organizational Choices (2011, methodology): “Of the few existing studies that make this distinction, Almeida et al. (2011) document evidence consistent with ours for a sample of Korean business groups.”
Does Family Control Matter? International Evidence from the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “…La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, and Shleifer 1999; Claessens et al. 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002; Volpin 2002; Lins 2003; Durnev and Kim 2005; Bennedsen et al. 2007; Bertrand et al. 2008; Almeida et al. 2011; Ellul, Pagano, and Panunzi 2010; Masulis, Pham, and Zein 2001; Franks et al. 2012). interest.”
Family Control and Financing Decisions (2011, unknown): “This theory is tested and supported by Almeida et al. (2011), who investigate the evolution of Korean chaebols where cross-shareholdings and pyramids are common.”
Internal Capital Market and Dividend Policies: Evidence from Business Groups (2014, unknown): “This assumption is confirmed in several studies that provide evidence of opacity associated with intra-group investments (Almeida et al. 2011).14 In addition, while direct investments by insiders in affiliated firms can also be manipulated to the insider’s benefit, the incremental monitoring…”
Internal Capital Markets in Business Groups: Evidence from the Asian Financial Crisis (2014, unknown): “We use covariates that are similar to those used in other recent papers that estimate matching models for investment, namely ﬁ rm size, Tobin’s q , cash ﬂ ow, cash holdings, leverage, pre-crisis investment and industry (see, e.g., Almeida et al., 2011 and Campello et al., 2010).”