A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy

By Jill J. McCluskey. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 2000

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Factors Influencing Consumers’ Willingness to Pay for Organic Fruits and Vegetables: Empirical Evidence from a Consumer Survey in India (2017, background): “As reported by Mccluskey (2000), labeling acts as an important source for consumers to recognize which organic products have gone through a comprehensive control system.”
The Reliability of Certification: Quality Labels as a Consumer Policy Tool (2005, background): “Other examples of imperfect monitoring standards can be found in Anania and Nistico` (2003), GfRS (2003), and McCluskey (2000) .”
Consumer perception of different organic certification schemes in five European countries (2011, background): “Markets with information asymmetry involve the danger of opportunistic behaviour in the supply chain such as fraud, since chances of being uncovered are low (McCluskey 2000; Darby and Karni 1973).”
Competing Environmental Labels (2014, background): “McCluskey (2000) demonstrates the importance of repeat purchases and third-party monitoring when certification is imperfect.”
The role of certificate issuer on consumers’ willingness‐to‐pay for milk traceability in China (2013, background): “When asymmetric information is present, supervision from the third party becomes critical to ensure food safety by visualizing the information that consumers cannot observe or easily detect (Caswell and Mojduszka, 1996; McCluskey, 2000).”