COMPETITIVE PRICING AND EFFICIENCY IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM

By Dale T. Mortensen, Randall Wright. 2002

232 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium (2009, methodology): “…we develop a canonical extension to the competitive search model (Montgomery, 1991; Peters, 1991; Moen, 1997; Shimer, 1996; Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999; Burdett, Shi and Wright, 2001; Mortensen and Wright, 2002) that allows for ex-ante heterogeneous agents with private information about their type.”
Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition (2010, background): “This implies that the solution to the FOC in (22) and (23) is a global maximum.”
Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications (2003, unknown): “In the benchmark competitive search equilibrium model of directed search (Moen 1997 or the extended version in Mortensen and Wright 2002), equilibrium is constrained Pareto e¢ cient.”
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market (2015, unknown): “The notion of competitive search builds on existing work with one-worker-per-firm (e.g., Peters (1991), Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b), Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) Shi (2001), Mortensen and Wright (2002) , Shimer (2005a)).”
Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion (2011, unknown): “This is because directed search separates agents into di¤erent submarkets according to their di¤erent waiting preferences (Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).”