Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium

By Veronica Guerrieri, Robert Shimer, Randall Wright. 2009

376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1480ff0f2b56bcfbe11b394a5f9971311b392135

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

In Management Science and Operations Research

Citations in the corpus

Liquidity and the Threat of Fraudulent Assets (2011, positive): “…related papers are Rocheteau ð2011Þ, which introduces an adverse selection problem in a monetary model to explain the illiquidity of risky assets, and Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright ð2010Þ, which considers a competitive search environment to illustrate how trading delays emerge endogenously to…”
Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Bonds (2012, background): “In the (41)He and Xiong (2012) prove this claim for given (c, p) in the LT96 framework.”
Perfect Competition in Markets with Adverse Selection (2017, methodology): “The game we consider in Section 4.2 is related to the search models of Inderst and Wambach (2001) and Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010).”
Testing for Information Asymmetries in Real Estate Markets (2015, positive): “The first is concerned with cases where assets are hard to distinguish from each other and traders on one side of the market are equally uninformed (Wilson 1980; Hellwig 1987; Gale 1992, 1996; Dubey and Geanakoplos 2002; Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright 2010).”
Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion (2011, positive): “This point then explains why the competitive search equilibrium is Pareto ine¢ cient for some parameter values, as shown in Guerrieri et al. (2010).”
Liquidity: A New Monetarist Perspective (2017, background): “58Recent studies of adverse selection in decentralized asset markets include Guerrieri et al. (2010), Chiu and Koeppl (2011), Chang (2012), Camargo and Lester (2014) and Hellwig and Zhang (2013), but there assets play no role in facilitating exchange.”
Directed Search in the Housing Market (2010, neutral): “See, for example, Guerrieri et al. (2010).”
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market (2015, positive): “It says that efficient job creation requires that the See also the Hosios condition in a large-firm model with intra-firm bargaining in Hawkins (2014). While an appropriate version of this condition is satisfied in many competitive search models, it can fail in the presence of intensive decision mar”
Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking (2016, background): “A third alternative would be to introduce search, free entry by principals and contract posting as in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Self-selection then makes type proportions among searchers in the market endogenous, in such a way that a separating equilibrium always exists.”