Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications

By James Albrecht, Pieter A. Gautier. Social Science Research Network, 2003

262 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We analyze a model of directed search in which unemployed job seekers observe all posted wages. We allow for the possibility of multiple applications by workers and ex post competition among vacancies. For any number of applications, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in which vacancies post a common wage. When workers apply to only one vacancy, a single wage is paid and the resulting equilibrium is efficient. When workers make multiple applications, there is dispersion in wages paid, and equilibrium may be inefficient. We show that our results also hold in a steady-state version of the model.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/0bb8b6bda59ee9ec842fe41ec5f03a898daf0ed4

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Citations in the corpus

Directed Search in the Housing Market (2010, unknown): “b(x) = 8><>>: 0 for 0 x < s x 1 e (x s) for s x < x a for x x (2)”
Efficiency of Simultaneous Search (2009, background): “In the models by Gautier and Moraga-González (2005), Albrecht et al. (2006), and Galenianos and Kircher (2008), it may become harder for firms to hire when workers send a second application.”
Inflation and Unemployment in the Long Run (2011, unknown): “We take the KW matching function to be M(B,S) = S [1− exp (−B/S)], the so-called urn-ball technology, which is a parsimonious specification and one that can be derived endogenously using directed search theory (Burdett et al. 2001; Albrect et al. 2006).”
Mismatch Unemployment and the Geography of Job Search (2018, methodology): “Our theoretical model is close to the one by Manning and Petrongolo (2011) and borrows elements from Albrecht et al. (2006) and Galenianos and Kircher (2009).”
Imperfect Competition in the Labor Market (2011, background): “…has evolved with different assumptions being made about the number of applications that can be made, what happens if workers get more than one job offer, what happens if the first worker offered a job does not want it (e.g. Albrecht et al., 2006; Galenianos and Kircher, 2009; Kircher, 2009).”
Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem (2014, background): “See Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett et al. (2001), Albrecht et al. (2003) and Kircher and Galenianos (2006)).”