Sorting and Decentralized Price Competition

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Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation (2010, background): “Since each agent wants to be in a coalition with output per agent, (y(C ω))/|C|, as high as possible, no agent wants to change a coalition with the highest output per agent.”
Adverse Selection and Liquidity Distortion (2011, unknown): “This is because directed search separates agents into di¤erent submarkets according to their di¤erent waiting preferences (Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)).”
Opening the Black Box of the Matching Function: The Power of Words (2020, background): “In particular, directed search models assign a key role to posted wages as an instrument for firms to attract the right pool of applicants (see e.g. Moen, 1997; Shimer, 2005a; Eeckhout & Kircher, 2010).”
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market (2015, unknown): “Much of this work considers large economies (see, e.g., Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a), Shi (2001), Shimer (2005a), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010)) whose micro-foundations combine Bertrand-style contract posting with coordination frictions: sometimes multiple workers apply for the same job…”
Identifying Sorting: In Theory (2009, unknown): “It is straightforward to see that this wage is exactly in the middle of the acceptance set W (x, y) outlined in (7) and (8) for off-equilibrium-wages of the frictionless model.”