Divisible-Good Auctions: The Role of Allocation Rules

111 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Underpricing and Market Power in Uniform Price Auctions (2004, unknown): “Our analysis builds on Kremer and Nyborg (2004).”
Asymmetric information and contract design for payments for environmental services (2008, background): “... to collusion (Athey et al., 2004) and manipulation by local power structures and the format's cost of assembling landowners in a common location, virtual or real; (3) indivisible versus divisible offers, where land units may be divisible and thus increase bidders' strategy space and make predict”
Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions (2005, background): “This is essentially a convexity condition on the residual supply and therefore a concavity condition on individual demand functions, especially since this must be satisfied along the continuum of possible stop-out prices [see Kremer and Nyborg (2004a) for further discussion].”