The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism

By Sergei Guriev, A. Rachinsky. 2005

393 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Political Science and International Relations, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/debcee5aa75b8da5d7c80985781da7191f2114c8

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Citations in the corpus

State Capacity, Minority Shareholder Protections, and Stock Market Development (2016, background): “To address whether countries might be imitating large economies, we also created a variable for the G7 (U.S., Japan, Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Canada), the G6 (i.e., the G7 excluding the U.S.), and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China).”
An institution-based view of international business strategy: a focus on emerging economies (2008, neutral): “…Czech Republic (Newman, 2000), Hungary (Rona-Tas, 1994; Stark, 1996), India (Kedia et al., 2006), Poland (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000), Russia (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005; Perotti & Gelfer, 2001; Puffer & An institution-based view of international business strategy Mike W Peng et al McCarthy,…”
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites? (2007, background): “In Israel, familyowned groups emerged as an outcome of certain government economic policies (Maman 2002), and the rise of the “oligarchs” in Russia is yet another recent (and very extreme) example of the emergence of groups under the auspices of the government (Guriev and Rachinsky 2005).”
Institutional environment, innovation capacity and firm performance in Russia (2013, background): “There is anecdotal evidence that the institutional landscape in Russia is marred by the weak rule of law, corruption and government inefficiencies (Aidis et al., 2008; Puffer et al., 2009; Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005) where entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals and do not trust the count”
The interaction of entrepreneurship and institutions (2010, neutral): “Institutions that reward rent seeking more than productive activities dominate the economy, and political influence from the Russian private sector can often be traced to oligarchs (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005).”
Rapid Institutional Shifts and the Co–evolution of Entrepreneurial Firms in Transition Economies (2010, background): “To be successful in Russian business, entrepreneurs would be wise to build relationships with government and key big businesspeople such as Russia’s oligarchs (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005; Rehn & Taalas, 2004).”
The Corporate Governance Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia (2006, background): “…abuses, where traditional corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective, and where we can identify an exogenous source of news coverage arising from the presence of an investment fund, the Hermitage fund, that tried to shame companies by exposing their abuses in the international media.”
State Control and Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: 25 Years on from 1989 (2016, neutral): “Of particular relevance to the study of state control is the relationship between the Russian top politicians and industrial tycoons Corporate Governance: An International Review 13 (‘oligarchs’) (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005).”