Complementarities and Games: New Developments
By Xavier Vives. 2005
346 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/dbe63617aacde66b76684e30f8efc9e3aff30a93
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Michael E. Porter
- Nicolaj Siggelkow
- Mehdi Shadmehr
- Dan Bernhardt
- N. Alexander
- T. Harland
- G. Fisher
- S. Manning
Citations in the corpus
- Contextuality Within Activity Systems and Sustainability of Competitive Advantage (2008, background): “A growing literature has continued to develop and apply the mathematical apparatus of supermodularity in a wide variety of formal models, addressing issues such as investments in product and process flexibility, optimal partitioning of design problems, and convergence to equilibria in learning games”
- Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation (2014, neutral): “22 See Echenique (2002) and Vives (2005).”
- Interbank Contagion at Work: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2011, neutral): “These results are partially consistent with the predictions of games of voluntary disclosure with verifiable information, where good types have an incentive to disclose their type (Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura 1990; Vives 2005).”
- Incidence and Growth of Patent Thickets - the Impact of Technological Opportunities and Complexity (2013, neutral): “This implies that symmetric equilibria exist if the game can be shown to be supermodular (Vives, 2005).9 In this game firms compete for granted patents on a technological opportunity.”
- Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs: Coordination, Public Signals, and Punishment Dilemmas (2011, result): “In contrast to the popular class of coordination games in which best responses exhibit global strategic complementarities (e.g., Morris and Shin 2003; Vives 1999, 2005), best responses in our game feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes.”