Explaining the Variance in the Performance Effects of Privatization

By Álvaro Cuervo, Belén Villalonga. 2000

273 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/da037b75c7f9416cb3362d33c56999ed84647189

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Citations in the corpus

Corruption, growth, and governance: Private vs. state-owned firms in Vietnam (2012, unknown): “Managers of private firms are disciplined by a number of external control mechanisms such as the labor market for managers and the market for corporate control, and by internal control mechanisms such as executive compensation (Cuervo and Villalonga, 2000).”
The Performance Differential between Private and State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership, Management and Market Structure (2008, background): “Although one should not put too much emphasis on the R2 measure, the fact that R2 is four times higher in the most restrictive model may also serve as an indicator of the most appropriate specification.”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “In the same context, Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) argue that the replacement of pre-privatization managers is called for in order to allow internal changes in the governance of newly privatized firms, while Barberis et al. (1996) specifically state that management skills rather than political…”
Governance, organizational capabilities, and restructuring in transition economies (2003, background): “This underlines the importance of continued contextual examination of privatization (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).”
New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications (2015, background): “…a few exceptions has there been an attempt to uncover what determines this performance gap, either by looking at different ownership configurations (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Ramamurti, 2000) or by outlining institutional conditions that may lead to smaller performance gaps (Bartel & Harrison,…”
Leviathan as a Minority Shareholder: Firm-Level Implications of State Equity Purchases (2013, methodology): “Under state ownership, conflicts are exacerbated because society (as a principal) delegates the monitoring of SOEs to politicians in charge of the government, who in turn are supposed to monitor SOE managers (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).”
Environmental Change and Organizational Transformation (2005, background): “Although a few recent studies have focused on the effect of large-scale environmental changes, particularly those produced by structural economic reforms, most of those papers have concentrated on specific issues, such as the change in labor wage schemes (Keister, 2002); the change in a firm’s outwa”
Political connections of newly privatized firms (2008, background): “Our conjecture is echoed by arguments in Cuervo and Villalonga (2000) that the replacement of preprivatization managers is called for in order to allow internal changes in the governance of NPFs.”
Institutions, size and age in transition economies: Implications for export growth (2010, background): “While private ownership has a strong research literature (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000), foreign ownership deserves more detailed investigation.”
The American Model of the Multinational Firm and the “New” Multinationals From Emerging Economies (2009, background): “This is the case, for instance, for some state-owned enterprises that undergo a restructuring process before their internationalization and privatization (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000).”