The Value and Incentive Effects of Nontraditional Executive Stock Option Plans

By Shane A. Johnson, Yisong S. Tian. 2000

222 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d7a20bc34c9675ded68954cdec37e6795045fafb

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Citations in the corpus

Real options with constant relative risk aversion (2002, methodology): “More pertinent to our analysis of real options is the study by Johnson and Tian (2000) of executive stock options.”
Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation (2018, unknown): “11 Johnson and Tian (2000) and Kuang and Suijs (2006) provide closed form solutions to stock options with a stock price barrier but do not consider valuation of these awards with accounting vesting provisions.”
Tournament Incentives, Firm Risk, and Corporate Policies (2012, background): “Specifically, optionbased compensation enhances managerial risk-taking incentives by providing convex payoffs (e.g., Smith and Stulz, 1985; Guay, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; and Chava and Purnanandam, 2010).”
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey (2005, unknown): “Johnson and Tian (2000) note some possible reasons for this empirical observation.”
Earnings Management around Employee Stock Option Reissues (2006, unknown): “The (original) Jones model is the same as above except there is no adjustment for change in receivables when calculating nondiscretionary accruals (PREDACCR). While the use of the modified Jones and the original Jones models to estimate discretionary accruals is widespread (see McNichols (2000)), th”
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay (2011, unknown): “To the extent that these targets are non-trivial, performance-based vesting will lower the value of an option or restricted share and decrease the incentives provided by the equity (e.g.,Johnson and Tian 2000).”
The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (2001, background): “…and Murphy (2000b), Huddart (1994), Kulatilaka and Marcus (1994), and Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991) on non-tradability, early exercise, and employee risk aversion, and Johnson and Tian (2000) on various other characteristics of executive stock options, such as re-pricing and reloading.”
On the optimality of resetting executive stock options (2000, background): “…ohg wr dq h{whqvlyh uhylvlrq ri wkh ruljlqdo sdshu1 Doo wkuhh dxwkruv duh dw wkh Ghsduwphqw ri Ilqdqfh/ Vwhuq Vfkrro ri Exvlqhvv/ Qhz \run Xqlyhuvlw|/ 77 Z1 7wk Vwuhhw/ Qhz \run/ Q\ 433451 Wkhlu uhvshfwlyh h0pdlo dgguhvvhv duh ydfkdu|dCvwhuq1q|x1hgx/ nmrkqCvwhuq1q|x1hgx/ dqg uvxqgdudCvwhuq1q|x1hgx1”
Stock and Option Grants with Performance-Based Vesting Provisions (2010, unknown): “Johnson and Tian (2000) and Kuang and Suijs (2006) demonstrate that performance-vested options can provide stronger incentives than traditional at-the-money options to increase stock price.”