Structural Models and Endogeneity in Corporate Finance: The Link Between Managerial Ownership and Corporate Performance

By Jeffrey L. Coles, Mike Lemmon, Felix Meschke. 2003

501 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d6c4a1ec493553c29d29e55afa30ee6c305430d1

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Citations in the corpus

Nontraditional Banking Activities and Bank Failures During the Financial Crisis (2013, unknown): “Meschke, Felix, Rajesh Aggarwal, and Tracy Wang, 2012.”
Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation (2009, unknown): “Endogeneity issues make it difficult to interpret the results from a regression analysis, and even standard econometric solutions such as a simultaneous equations approach may fail to fully address the endogeneity issues (Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke, 2005).”
Governance and Performance Revisited (2004, background): “Coles et al. (2003) questions this simple idea by showing that when managerial ownership is optimally tailored to managerial and capital productivity in every firm, reasonable parameter values produce a roughly quadratic cross-sectional relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s q.”
Endogeneity in Accounting and Finance Research: Natural Experiments as a State-of-the-Art Solution (2015, unknown): “Many studies show corporate governance structure to be a largely endogenous characteristic of the firm (Coles et al., 2012; Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hoang et al., 2014; Wintoki et al., 2012). So for the vast number of corporate governance studies showing a relation between governance a”
Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “Likewise, firms may appoint independent directors for their networks of directorships (Akbas, Meschke, and Wintoki, 2016; Coles et al., 2012) or to suit their own information environment (Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo, 2011; Coles et al., 2008).”
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area (2011, unknown): “4 As Coles et al. (2006), GIM, and GM point out, slowly changing explanatory variables, such as our corporate governance index, may render firm fixed effects techniques ineffective.”
Ownership Structure and Firm Performance: Evidence from Vietnamese Listed Firms (2016, background): “The standard deviation of Tobin’s Q of listed firms in Vietnam is 0.414, lower than the value of 2.043 in the USA (Coles et al., 2012), and 0.834 in China (Yu, 2013).”
Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis (2009, background): “This supports the theoretical framework proposed by Coles et al. (2005, 2008) and Boone et al. (2007) that there is a range of board structures that are consistent with value-maximisation and that adopting the Combined Code has brought about little change in the effectiveness of governance…”
Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations (2007, unknown): “Coles, Lemmon, and Meschke (2006) present a pessimistic critique of the ability of instrumental variables to identify the impact of ownership on valuations.”