Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

By A. Low. 2009

765 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/eec969aacfa589e87554f510d6d1c41815bce350

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. V. Atanasov
2. Bernard S. Black
3. Christopher S. Armstrong
4. David F. Larcker
5. Daniel J. Taylor
6. Todd A. Gormley
7. David A. Matsa
8. Gaizka Ormazabal

In Finance

1. David F. Larcker
2. Daniel J. Taylor
3. Todd A. Gormley
4. Christopher S. Armstrong
5. David A. Matsa
6. V. Atanasov
7. Bernard S. Black
8. Gaizka Ormazabal

Citations in the corpus

• Can corporate social responsibility protect firm value during the COVID-19 pandemic? (2020, methodology): “(4) To test H2, we use the difference-in-difference method following Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999a, 1999b, 2003) and Low (2009).”
• The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Bank Loan Contracting (2013, background): “See, for instance, Bertrand and Mullainathan (1999, 2003) and Low (2009).”
• Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, neutral): “We examine two different types of risk: exposure to market risk (measured by beta) and the level of idiosyncratic/firm-specific risk (as per Low, 2009).”
• Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation (2015, neutral): “This feature has received extensive attention in studies on the relation between executive compensation and risk-taking (e.g., Smith and Stulz 1985, Guay 1999, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 2006, Low 2009).”
• Effects of culture on firm risk-taking: a cross-country and cross-industry analysis (2012, neutral): “Low (2009), among many others, has proved that equitybased compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior.”
• Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate Finance and Accounting Research (2015, methodology): “If the treatment (or, 54Rauh (2006) and Low (2009) are the only “true DiDiD” papers in our sample and use a sensible third difference (existence of a staggered board).”
• Executive stock options, gender diversity in the top management team, and firm risk taking (2015, methodology): “Moreover, as in prior research (Brockman et al., 2010; Coles et al., 2006; Knopf, Nam, & Thornton, 2002; Low, 2009), we apply the method developed by Core and Guay (2002) in order to approximate deltas and vegas for previously granted options.”
• Firm Life Cycle, Corporate Risk Taking, and Investor Sentiment (2017, neutral): “Corporate risk-taking has important implications for firm growth, performance and survival (Bromiley, 1991), but has also been established in the literature as a serious agency problem (Low, 2009).”
• Managerial Risk Taking (2016, neutral): “…compensation is intended to align managerial interests with shareholder interests, it may also create excessive risk bearing for the CEOs, exacerbating risk aversion (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2006; Low, 2009) and may lead CEOs to shift risk bearing based on their exposure (Eisenhardt, 1989).”