Supply Chain Coordination Under Channel Rebates with Sales Effort Effects

By Terry A. Taylor. Management Sciences, 2002

889 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d64c0b6876ffdf24bee2bb3a00a642d6d67d9136

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. Tsan-Ming (Jason) Choi
2. Gérard P. Cachon
3. Xuanming Su
4. Chun-Hung Chiu
5. Hongtao Zhang
6. Qi Feng
7. Suresh P. Sethi
8. Vinod R. Singhal

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Xuanming Su
2. Gérard P. Cachon
3. Hongtao Zhang
4. Qi Feng
5. Suresh P. Sethi
6. Tamer Boyaci
7. Lauren Xiaoyuan Lu
8. Xianghua Gan

In Marketing

1. Tsan-Ming (Jason) Choi
2. Gérard P. Cachon
3. Xuanming Su
4. Suresh P. Sethi
5. Chun-Hung Chiu
6. Qi Feng
7. Xianghua Gan
8. Hongtao Zhang

Citations in the corpus

• Competitive stocking and coordination in a multiple-channel distribution system (2005, background): “Revenue sharing contracts (Cachon and Lariviere, 2000) and rebate contracts (Taylor, 2002) have also been shown to achieve coordination in this setting.”
• Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers (2004, neutral): “See Lariviere (1999), Tsay et al. (1999) and Taylor (2000) for an in depth analysis of this special model.”
• The Impact of Demand Uncertainty on Consumer Subsidies for Green Technology Adoption (2016, positive): “Mechanisms such as rebates (Taylor 2002) or revenue sharing (Cachon and Lariviere 2005) can coordinate the players to optimize the aggregate surplus in the supply chain.”
• Omnichannel Retail Operations with Buy-Online-and-Pick-up-in-Store (2017, neutral): “For the former, there is a large body of literature on the design of optimal contracts to optimize supply chain performance; see, for example, Lee and Whang (1999); Taylor (2002); Cachon and Lariviere (2005).”
• Price, Rebate, and Returns Supply Contracts for Coordinating Supply Chains with Price‐Dependent Demands (2011, background): “Taylor (2002) is the first to show that the linear rebate policy fails to coordinate the supply chain, whereas the target sales rebate policy can achieve coordination if the demand is price independent.”
• Managing Risk of Supply Disruptions: Incentives for Capacity Restoration (2013, background): “…counter demand uncertainty at the downstream end of a supply chain, with the objective of coordinating the chain: rebates (Aydin and Porteus 2008, Taylor 2002, Taylor and Xiao 2009), returns (Krishnan et al. 2004, Padmanab-han and Png 1997, Pasternack 1985, Taylor and Xiao 2009), revenue sharing…”
• Buyer vendor coordination models in supply chain management (2006, background): “Recently, Taylor (2002) has introduced channel rebate as coordination mechanism for the supply chain.”
• Newsvendor model for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns (2014, background): “We study a dyadic supply chain with a single supplier and a single retailer in a single-period, stochastic demand (newsvendor) setting, as widely concerned in channel-related researches such as Cachon [2], Taylor [24], etc.”
• Supply chain coordination with trade credit and quantity discount incorporating default risk (2014, neutral): “Papers by Pasternack (1985), Padmanabhan and Png (1997), Taylor (2002), Dawn et al. (2002), Cachon and Lariviere (2001, 2005), Krishnan and Winter (2010), Cachon and Kok (2010) are the examples.”