Determinants of Performance Measure Choices in Worker Incentive Plans

By Christopher D. Ittner, David F. Larcker. Journal of Labor Economics, 2002

152 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Information Systems, Management Science and Operations Research, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d3dc0437d7478b0bec90d982842787b327e1b74d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Information Systems

1. Frank Selto
2. M. Malina
3. Andy Neely
4. Utz Schäffer
5. Bernard Marr
6. Franziska Fischer
7. Michael Burkert
8. Matthew Hall

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Frank Selto
2. M. Malina
3. Andy Neely
4. Utz Schäffer
5. Bernard Marr
6. Michael Burkert

In Strategy and Management

1. Bernard Marr
2. Andy Neely
3. D. Gray
4. Frank Selto
5. M. Malina
6. Michael Burkert
7. Jan Mouritsen
8. Suresh Cuganesan

Citations in the corpus

• Why do firms measure their intellectual capital (2003, background): “Therefore, it has been suggested that ®nancial performance measures should be supplemented or replaced by non-®nancial measures, which are more informative of employees’ actions and can improve contracting (Ittner and Larcker, 2002).”
• Subjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard (2003, unknown): “A number of cross-sectional empirical studies draw upon informativeness theories when examining the relative weights placed on individual, non-financial, or subjective performance measures (e.g., Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997; Murphy and Oyer, 2001; Ittner and Larcker, 2002).”
• Assessing the Performance of Business Unit Managers (2007, unknown): “…on the use of non-financial and disaggregated measures includes the observation that non-financial measures are often very concrete “behavioral” measures (Ittner and Larcker 2002), i.e., measures that recommend or prohibit certain actions by managers (e.g., absenteeism, safety inspection ratings).”
• Application of the Controllability Principle and Managerial Performance: The Role of Role Perceptions (2011, background): “Companies can direct managers’ attention to critical performance areas and gain additional information about their hidden actions by partially disregarding the principle (Ittner and Larcker, 2002; Manzoni, 2002; Simons, 2007).”
• Assessing empirical research in managerial accounting: a value-based management perspective (2001, unknown): “Ittner and MacDuffie (1995) find that cost drivers such as product variety and automation affect manufacturing overhead not only directly, but also indirectly through increased direct labor requirements and the resulting need for higher supetvisory and administrative staffmg.”
• Choice and Change of Measures in Performance Measurement Models (2004, background): “Firms’ management controls can benefit from greater diversity of performance measures (i.e., operational, strategic, financial, and non-financial measures) if operational measures reflect the current drivers of future financial performance and are early in the value chain (Ittner & Larcker, 2002).”