Using innovative instructions to create trustworthy software solutions

By Matthew Hoekstra, Reshma Lal, Pradeep Pappachan, Vinay Phegade, J. Cuvillo. 2013

435 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

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In Information Systems

Citations in the corpus

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, positive): “Ekiden is implemented with Intel SGX [8, 40, 61], a specific provider of TEEs, but we emphasize that it may use any comparable TEE with attestation capabilities.”
Contamination Attacks and Mitigation in Multi-Party Machine Learning (2018, methodology): “Each party can verify that the server is running the correct code and only then share the data with it (e.g., using remote attestation if using Intel SGX [20] as described in [33, 37]).”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “We use trusted SGX processors [3], [27], [41] as a building block, but we need to solve several challenges not directly addressed by the hardware.”
Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange using Trusted Hardware (2017, background): “For more information on the SGX architecture, see [1, 44, 43, 61].”
Intel SGX Explained (2016, methodology): “Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [14, 79, 139] implements secure containers for applications without making any modifications to the processor’s critical execution path.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “These protections appear adequate for the small-TCB security applications for which SGX was designed [26], as the developers of security applications can be expected to mitigate higher-level side channels in software.”
AsyncShock: Exploiting Synchronisation Bugs in Intel SGX Enclaves (2016, methodology): “Although it was initially assumed that only small tailored applications would be executed inside enclaves [11], a recent trend is to consider enclaves as a generic isolation environment for arbitrary applications: VC3 [21] uses enclaves to secure computation for the Hadoop map/reduce framework; Have”
Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016, background): “SGX. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [8,21,28, 30] is a set of new instructions that confer hardware protections on user-level code.”
REM: Resource-Efficient Mining for Blockchains (2017, background): “Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [45, 46, 48, 49, 13, 43, 62] is a set of new instructions available on recent-model Intel CPUs that confers hardware protections on user-level code.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “With the advent of Intel SGX [32], support for Protected Module Architectures (PMAs) is now available on mainstream consumer hardware, and can be used to defend against malicious or compromised system software, both in an untrustworthy cloud environment [3, 36] as well as for desktop applications [1”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “…of shielded execution has encouraged researchers and practitioners to develop various new applications to utilize these features ( e.g. , [2, 22, 51, 54, 59, 68, 69, 85, 88]), and new software tools or frameworks ( e.g. , [4, 5, 9, 24, 43, 50, 61, 65, 67, 72, 80]) to help developers adopt…”
CHET: Compiler and Runtime for Homomorphic Evaluation of Tensor Programs (2018, background): “Non-cryptographic technologies such as secure enclaves [24] (such as Intel SGX [18]) requires one to trust a hardware vendor.”
High-Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2017, methodology): “Intel SGX [6, 26, 29, 34] is a CPU technology recently introduced by Intel.”
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “y guarantees. Although SGX is still in its infancy, the promise of shielded execution has encouraged researchers and practitioners to develop various new applications to utilize these features (e.g., [2, 22, 51, 54, 59, 68, 69, 85, 88]), and new software tools or frameworks (e.g., [4, 5, 9, 24, 43, ”
Intel® Software Guard Extensions (Intel® SGX) Software Support for Dynamic Memory Allocation inside an Enclave (2016, methodology): “An introduction to a programming model and an SGX Run-Time Environment are provided in [3] and [4].”
Moat: Verifying Confidentiality of Enclave Programs (2015, methodology): “Hoekstra et al. [23] propose the following OTP scheme based on SGX, which we implement (Figure 1) and verify using Moat .”
Oblivious Multi-Party Machine Learning on Trusted Processors (2016, methodology): “Our protocols are standard, and similar to those used in prior work for outsourcing computations [29,57].”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, background): “While SGX was designed to enable new trust-worthy applications to protect speciﬁc secrets by placing portions of their code and data inside enclaves [24], Haven aims to shield entire unmodiﬁed legacy applications written without any knowledge of SGX.”
Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves (2017, background): “Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [16] is a new processor feature that isolates security-critical applications from system software such as hypervisors, operating systems, or the BIOS.”