Innovative Technology for CPU Based Attestation and Sealing

By Ittai Anati, Shay Gueron, Simon Johnson, Vincent Scarlata. 2013

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Citations in the corpus

Ekiden: A Platform for Confidentiality-Preserving, Trustworthy, and Performant Smart Contracts (2018, positive): “Ekiden is implemented with Intel SGX [8, 40, 61], a specific provider of TEEs, but we emphasize that it may use any comparable TEE with attestation capabilities.”
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX (2015, methodology): “SGX supports sealed storage and attestation [3].”
A Protocol for Privately Reporting Ad Impressions at Scale (2016, background): “The commercial availability of platforms such as ARM TrustZone [9] and Intel’s SGX [10] raises the possibility that such deployments may be feasible in the future, but widespread availability of these technologies in commodity cloud computing platforms remains some years in the future.”
Towards Scaling Blockchain Systems via Sharding (2018, background): “A user can verify if a specific TEE is correctly instantiated and running at a remote host via a remote attestation protocol [9].”
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven (2014, methodology): “Attestation SGX supports CPU-based attestation [2], enabling a remote system to verify cryptographically that specific software has been loaded within an enclave, and establish shared secrets allowing it to bootstrap an end-toend encrypted channel with the enclave.”
Town Crier: An Authenticated Data Feed for Smart Contracts (2016, background): “SGX. Intel’s Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [8,21,28, 30] is a set of new instructions that confer hardware protections on user-level code.”
Jump over ASLR: Attacking branch predictors to bypass ASLR (2016, background): “Another relevant application of a user-level ASLR attack is to perform layout de-randomization in isolated execution environments, where application secrets are protected inside enclaves or compartments [37], [38], [39], [40].”
This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation (OSDI ’16). (unknown): “Instead, after the executable has initialized the enclave, the SCF is received through a TLS-protected network connection, established during en-clave startup [2].”
Innovative instructions and software model for isolated execution (2013, unknown): “This is described in [2].”
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX (2017, background): “• Reducing side effects of memory side-channel attacks . demonstrate that a large number of AEXs are not a necessary condition attack, called sneaky page monitoring (SPM). setting and resetting a page’s accessed flag in the page table entry page is accessed, manipulation of the accessed flags does n”
Solidus: Confidential Distributed Ledger Transactions via PVORM (2017, background): “SGX provides a new set of instructions that permits execution of an application inside an enclave [4, 34, 40], which protects the application’s control-ﬂow integrity and con-ﬁdentiality against even a hostile operating system.”
Graphene-SGX: A Practical Library OS for Unmodified Applications on SGX (2017, background): “A SGX enclave can also trust a remote service or enclave, and be trusted after inter-platform attestation [13].”
Tesseract: Real-Time Cryptocurrency Exchange using Trusted Hardware (2017, background): “For more information on the SGX architecture, see [1, 44, 43, 61].”
Cache Attacks on Intel SGX (2017, background): “3065915 Since 2015, Intel addresses this threat with hardware instructions and provides an architecture extension called Software Guard Extensions (SGX) that creates secure containers, socalled enclaves, to protect applications against access from higher privileges, including the OS kernel [1, 7].”
Keystone: an open framework for architecting trusted execution environments (2020, background): “The SM can implement trusted timers, rollback defense [35], and sealed storage [15] with these features.”
An Algorithmic Framework For Differentially Private Data Analysis on Trusted Processors (2018, methodology): “Additionally, Intel SGX supports software attestation [3] that allows the enclave code to get messages signed with a private key of the processor along with a digest of the enclave.”
Hacking in Darkness: Return-oriented Programming against Secure Enclaves (2017, background): “Attestation is a secure assertion mechanism that confirms the correct application has been properly instantiated on a specific platform [1].”
High-Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2017, methodology): “Intel SGX [6, 26, 29, 34] is a CPU technology recently introduced by Intel.”
Telling Your Secrets without Page Faults: Stealthy Page Table-Based Attacks on Enclaved Execution (2017, background): “This allows the integrity of the untrusted loading process to be attested to a remote stakeholder [1].”