The Identification Power of Equilibrium in Simple Games
By Andrés Aradillas-López, Elie Tamer. 2008
106 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e8a8d6cf1bb9ab90f7b7499c18c993c4950215d0
How researchers see this paper
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In Management Science and Operations Research
- Steven N. Durlauf
- Yannis M. Ioannides
- Francesca Molinari
- Arie Beresteanu
- William A. Brock
- L. Blume
- Ilya S. Molchanov
- Á. D. Paula
In Marketing
- Yannis M. Ioannides
- L. Blume
- Ilya S. Molchanov
- Steven N. Durlauf
- Francesca Molinari
- Á. D. Paula
- William A. Brock
- Arie Beresteanu
Citations in the corpus
- A NOTE ON SEMIPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF FINITE MIXTURES OF DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH APPLICATION TO GAME THEORETIC MODELS (2011, unknown): “See Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008) and Beresteanu, Molchanov, and Molinari (2008), e.g., for recent applications of this approach.”
- Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria (2012, methodology): “If observable outcomes y correspond to Nash equilibria of the above game, the following econometric model is obtained (see Aradillas-Lopez & Tamer 2008 for examples using other solution concepts): ypi ¼ x u i bi þ yjDi þ ui, yi ¼ 1ypi $ 0. ð1Þ If Di < 0, this can be analyzed using Figure 1.”
- Identification of Social Interactions (2011, methodology): “This approach is based on Aradillas-Lopez (2008) and AradillasLopez and Tamer (2008) which develop methods for estimating games in which players are sophisticated but not rational in the standard sense.54 Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer do this by assuming that individual beliefs are rationalizable in…”
- Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information (2011, unknown): “The identi cation results here, in particular the contrast between Bayes Nash equilibrium and Bayes correlated equilibrium, are related to, but distinct from the results presented in Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008).”
- Sharp identification regions in models with convex moment predictions (2010, background): “…¯x θ u)= u ′[1(y = tk) k= 1 κY ] − E[h(Qθ u)|¯x] 1Specifically, we illustrate this by looking at games where rationality of level 1 is the solution concept (a problem first studied by Aradillas-Lopez and Tamer (2008)) and by looking at games where correlated equilibrium is the solution…”