Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices

By K. Cremers, Vinay B. Nair. 2005

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More on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the UK : evidence from the application of generalized method of moments estimation (2016, background): “Similarly, Cremers and Nair (2005), Brown and Caylor (2006), Bozec et al. (2008) and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) use the governance index of Gompers et al. (2003) for investigating the interaction of corporate control and shareholder activism in the US.”
Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence (2007, positive): “The relation between Leverage and governance has been previously studied by Cremers and Nair (2005), among others.”
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Is There an Expectations Gap? (2006, neutral): “Although more recent work considerably expands the governance factors examined, it has only been able to find relationships with a minority of those factors (Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell, 2004; Brown and Caylor, 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 2003).”
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns (2007, background): “Institutional ownership: Cremers and Nair (2004) find evidence that the market for corporate control is effective only when a firm’s internal corporate governance is strong, and vice versa.”
The Relative Value Relevance of Shareholder Versus Stakeholder Corporate Governance Disclosure Policy Reforms in South Africa (2012, positive): “For example, previous US (Gompers et al., 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005) and European (Drobetz et al., 2004; Beiner et al., 2006) studies report a positive link between disclosing shareholder CG practices and firm value, although others have highlighted the need for robust estimates by addressing…”
Agency costs, ownership structure and corporate governance compliance: A private contracting perspective (2010, background): “…from stronger shareholder rights and legal protection mechanisms which lower investor capital costs (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1998, 2000; Beck et al., 2003), or incentive effects associated with takeover vulnerability (Gompers et al., 2003; Bebchuk et al., 2004; Cremers and Nair, 2005).”
Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices (2007, positive): “Similar to Cremers and Nair (2005), we interpret ATI as a more narrow proxy for takeover vulnerability, while the EXT index measures more broadly the level of shareholder rights.”
Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and Evidence (2017, positive): “Studying long- rather than short-run returns, Cremers and Nair (2005) find that a portfolio that buys (sells) firms with the highest (lowest) level of takeover vulnerability generates an annualized return of 10–15% only when public pension fund ownership is also high. This finding suggests that outs”
Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence (2014, neutral): “b mX ≡ σ(2)XmX + s(2)XPX(1) s(2)X + σ 2 X , (8)”
The choice of corporate liquidity and corporate governance (2009, methodology): “The interaction between the weakened threat of takeover and the activism of institutional investors is consistent with the complementary role of the two mechanisms of corporate governance as documented by Cremers and Nair (2005). This trade-o¤ view of liquidity choice has several implications for a ”