Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns

By Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang, Feixue Xie. 2007

1,818 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/923b6d3910d7d8c4fdbd37414fee31abb76ca1fe

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Citations in the corpus

How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, positive): “Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) document that staggered boards are associated with lower ﬁrm valuation as proxied by Tobin’s Q. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with staggered boards are associated with value-decreasing acquisition decisions, while Faleye (2007) reports that staggered boards…”
Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies (2009, result): “For the other explanatory variables, most of their coefficient estimates are consistent with the findings in prior studies such as Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) and Masulis et al. (2007).”
Policy Uncertainty and Mergers and Acquisitions (2017, positive): “Following McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (1997), Poole and Rosenthal (2000), and Gulen and Ion (2016), we use the partisan polarization measure”
Product Market Competition, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value: Evidence from the EU Area (2011, neutral): “Prior literature provides some guidance with regards to potential channels, e.g., inefficient investment (GIM), value-destroying acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007), cost management (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003), or cash management (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).”
Corporate Governance and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Director Limited Liability and Indemnification Provisions (2011, neutral): “11 Therefore, similar to the incidences of classified boards as documented in the literature (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005; Masulis et al., 2007; Bates et al., 2008; Chen, 2010), it appears that most LLI provisions were also established prior to 1990, presumably at the height of hostile takeovers, and ch”
Value creation from M&As: New evidence (2017, positive): “20 Although our board independence variable is continuous, in unreported tests we have also used an indicator equal to 1 when independent directors comprise more than 50% of the board as in Masulis et al. (2007) and obtain similar results.”
CEO Narcissism and the Takeover Process: From Private Initiation to Deal Completion (2016, positive): “The mean governance score of acquirers in our sample is 9.47, which is close to that in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) who report a mean score of 9.45.”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers (2013, positive): “In examining the effect of a firm's CSR on merger announcement returns, we follow Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) and include as control variables acquirer-specific characteristics (firm size, leverage, free cash flow, Tobin's q, and previous market-adjusted returns) and deal-specific characteristics…”
Financial Statement Comparability and the Efficiency of Acquisition Decisions (2018, positive): “value creation or value destruction of acquisition investment decisions (Jensen, 1986; Lang et al. 1991; Masulis et al., 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Harford, et al., 2012).”
CEO network centrality and merger performance (2015, background): “Our results complement other papers (e.g., Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Masulis et al., 2007; Harford and Li, 2007; Lehn and Zhao, 2006) in showing that the bidder CEO's skills and attributes play a key role during the M&A process.”
Underinvestment vs. overinvestment: Evidence from price reactions to pension contributions (2009, methodology): “…expenditures (McConnell and Muscarella (1985)), acquisitions (Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007)), and dividend initiations (Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2006), and Officer (2007)).”
Corporate governance, financial management decisions and firm performance: Evidence from the maritime industry (2014, background): “…corporate governance and investments in the maritime industry since the literature indicates that strong corporate governance can mitigate sub-optimal investments in the cross section of industrial firms (e.g., Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2008; Richardson, 2006; Bohren et al., 2009).”
Corporate Governance, External Market Discipline and Firm Productivity (2011, positive): “As in Nickell et al. (1997) and Koke and Renneboog (2005), we use lagged values of control variables to reduce reverse causality.”
Serial Acquirer Bidding: An Empirical Test of the Learning Hypothesis (2011, background): “The deal size is greater than $1 million and equal to t least 1% of the acquirer’s market value (see Masulis et al., 2007); and 5.”