Corporate Governance and Innovation: Theory and Evidence
By Haresh Sapra, Ajay Subramanian, Krishnamurthy Subramanian. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2014
252 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b42a65280a6c720ed8c1ac82a22a35f5513d06b
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In Accounting
- Karthik Krishnan
- Lei-Lei Kong
- Qianqian Yu
- Gustavo Manso
- S. Rhee
- Edward J. Podolski
- Madhu Veeraraghavan
- Yangyang Chen
In Economics and Econometrics
- Thomas J. Chemmanur
- Lei-Lei Kong
- Gustavo Manso
- Qianqian Yu
- S. Rhee
- Knut Blind
- Cédric Schneider
- Woon Sau Leung
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Governance and Innovation: A Survey (2012, unknown): “…arise in very different veins of the literature, such as corporate ownership, management, finance and labour (see for instance Lacetera, 2001; Casper and Matraves, 2003; Michie and Sheehan, 2003; Shipton et al., 2005; Lerner et al., 2008; Aghion et al., 2009; Sapra et al., 2009; Ughetto, 2010).”
- Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation? (2009, background): “How large would the principal’s profits be if the principal wanted to implement exploration with a standard pay-for-performance rather than an exploration contract?”
- Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More? (2014, unknown): “We also control for staggered board elections because Faleye (2009) and Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2014) show that investments in corporate innovation are significantly affected by antitakeover provisions.”
- Local Gambling Preferences and Corporate Innovative Success (2014, background): “…and Simcoe (2011), Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012)), institutional ownership (Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)), corporate governance (Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2014)), analysts following (He and Tian (2013)), stock liquidity (Fang, Tian, and Tice (2014)), banking…”
- The Impact of Regulation on Innovation (2016, background): “Sapra et al. (2011) develop a theory of the effects of external corporate governance mechanisms such as takeover pressure and internal mechanisms such as compensation contracts and monitoring intensity on innovation by firms.”
- Credit Supply and Corporate Innovation (2013, background): “shown in Scherer (1983) and more recently in Balasubramanian and Sivadasan (2011), the”
- Corporate Governance and Green Innovation (2016, unknown): “takeover pressures can (1) decrease innovation due to moral hazard (Atanassov 2013), (2) increase innovation by insulating managers from short-term pressure (Chemmanur and Tian 2013), that (3) the governance-innovation relationship is U-shaped (Sapra et al. 2014), or that”
- Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobility, and Corporate Innovation (2018, background): “…Tian and Wang (2014), and Chemmanur, Loutskina, and Tian (2014)), anti-takeover provisions (e.g., Atanassov (2013), Chemmanur and Tian (2018), and Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2014)), institutional ownership (e.g., Aghion, Van Reenen, and Zingales (2013)), CEO overconfidence…”
- Are employee-friendly workplaces conducive to innovation? (2016, background): “To account for the potential impact of corporate governance on the level of innovative activity (O’Connor and Rafferty, 2012; Sapra et al., 2014), we include the fraction of independent directors on the board (Board independence) as well as the entrenchment index (E index) compiled by Bebchuk et…”
- Do Antitakeover Provisions Spur Corporate Innovation? A Regression Discontinuity Analysis (2018, unknown): “Different from Atanassov (2013) and Sapra et al. (2014), we use firm-level ATP information and the RD approach to tackle the research question.”
- Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States (2019, unknown): “Following Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2014), we use each patent’s assignee name and location information from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Patent Database to attribute a firm’s patents to its subsidiaries/divisions to which the patent was granted.”