Governance Mechanisms and Bond Prices

By Martijn Cremers, Vinay B. Nair, Chenyang Wei. 2007

324 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1954d1361c204cae2f86bf9f61079b5ee15cc9fa

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Corporate Boards and the Leverage and Debt Maturity Choices (2007, unknown): “Public pension holding is defined as aggregate holdings by active public pensions as identified in Cremers and Nair (2005), normalised by the number of shares outstanding.”
Board Quality and the Cost of Debt Capital: The Case of Bank Loans (2012, unknown): “Finally, Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) find that institutional shareholdings, as a proxy for shareholder control, increase bond yields if the firm is exposed to takeovers, but not in firms where bonds have event risk protection.”
Capital Structure and Corporate Governance Quality: Evidence from the Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) (2012, unknown): “…outcomes such as firm value (Brown & Caylor, 2006; Cremers & Nair, 2005; Gompers et al., 2003; Park et al., 2008), costs of debt financing (Cremers et al., 2007), corporate diversification (Jiraporn et al., 2006), cash holding (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007), debt maturity structure…”
Correcting for Cross-Sectional and Time-Series Dependence in Accounting Research (2010, unknown): “27 variable (e.g., Ahmed et al. 2002; Shi 2003; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Cremers et al. 2007; Eberhardt et al. 2008; Lee 2008; Hann et al. 2007; Jiang 2008; Mansi et al. 2004, 2009).”
Corporate hedging and the cost of debt (2014, methodology): “…cost of debt relates to the optimal financing decisions (Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2010)), market for corporate control (Qiu and Yu (2009)), institutional investors (Elyasiani, Jia, and Mao (2010)), and corporate governance (Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) and Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005)).”
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow and the Effect of Shareholder Rights on the Implied Cost of Equity Capital (2010, background): “Among others, Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond (2006b), Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell (2005), and Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) study the effect of shareholder rights on the cost of debt.”