Misreporting Corporate Performance

By O. Bar‐Gill, L. Bebchuk. 2002

128 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cdb4817d880b4e6865d6478c4bab49aed90ba9f0

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Citations in the corpus

Equity Incentives and Corporate Fraud in China (2015, background): “Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) report that lax accounting and legal environments can increase the incidence of misreporting and consequently distortions in capital allocations.”
Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial Statements? the Role of Option Compensation and Other Factors (2007, unknown): “This is consistent with an analytical model developed by Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003), which predicts greater misreporting by managers with substantial option holdings, even when managers don’t sell their shares until the final realization period.”
The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting (2006, background): “CEO’s exercising options during the period of alleged manipulation are able to camouflage their inside information by pooling with managers who are exercising for liquidity reasons (Bergstresser and Phillippon (2002), Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2003)).”
Booms, Busts, and Fraud (2007, background): “Bebchuk and Bar-Gill (2002) present a model in which firms may commit fraud so as to obtain better terms when issuing shares to raise funds for further investments; this incentive to commit fraud increases if managers can sell some of their own shares in the short run or if accounting and legal rule”
Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts (2009, background): “Theoretical models such as Stein (1989) and Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2003) suggest that firms that are planning to issue equity will be more likely to behave myopically or misreport corporate performance.”
The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting (2017, background): “long-term performance (Stein 1989; Bar-Gill and Bebchuk 2003). Stein (1989) also indicates that myopic behavior is particularly prevalent when there is pressure from capital markets.”
Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, unknown): “For example, equity ownership may increase the incentive for management to commit fraud (Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2008)), to misreport corporate performance (Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2002)), and to reject”