The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting

112 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Corporate Governance and Blockchains (2017, unknown): “…managerial incentives, since 22 Similarly, the introduction of quarterly earnings reporting in the European Union appears to have led to firms reducing long-term investments, improving short-term earnings at the expense of long-term earnings, according to the findings of Ernstberger et al. (2016).”
The impact of carbon disclosure mandates on emissions and financial operating performance (2020, unknown): “(2017), and managerial short-termism (Ernstberger et al. 2017; Granja 2018; Kraft et al. 2018).”
Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia (2018, background): “(2016), Ernstberger et al. (2016) focus on real earnings manipulation to meet quarterly earnings benchmarks and find evidence of increased real earnings management”
Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting* (2019, unknown): “These include papers documenting that higher reporting frequency induces myopic managerial behavior (Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam, 2018; Ernstberger et al., 2017).”
The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review (2019, background): “1 Shareholder-debtholder conflicts Prior research points out that debt and equity holders have different investment preferences following from their different payoff structures, which creates conflicts of interest (Fama and Miller, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner, 1979”