The Impact of Performance-based Compensation on Misreporting

By Natasha Burns, Simi Kedia. 2006

1,262 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/43a28294c4c0e39022f1ca39e8b35cb64f244c3b

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Citations in the corpus

Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth (2007, positive): “Prior research has documented significant differences in board composition and executive compensation for firms engaged in fraud (e.g. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Beasley (1996), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), Burns and Kedia (2005)).”
Earnings quality: Evidence from the field (2013, background): “For instance, Burns and Kedia (2006) and Efendi et al. (2007) conclude that incentive compensation drives earnings management but Armstrong et al. (2010) dispute this conclusion.”
The Effects of Firm-Initiated Clawback Provisions on Bank Loan Contracting (2013, background): “For example, Chan et al. (2012a), Babenko et al. (2012), and Chen et al. (2012) do not find that prior restatement history is correlated with clawback adoption, suggesting that financial reporting quality does not affect the decision to adopt clawbacks.”
Board Committees, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Management (2009, neutral): “The first derivative with respect to b is bm(2)1 + bm 2 2(1− e)(2) − b(2)m(2)2(1− e) de db , (8)”
Why do CFOs Become Involved in Material Accounting Manipulations (2011, neutral): “likelihood of restatements (e.g., Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; McVay, Nagar and Tang, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006).”
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation (2013, neutral): “…(such as the degree of earnings management as measured by accruals, SEC accounting enforcement actions, accounting restatements, and shareholder class action litigation) include Bergstresser and Philippon (2006), Burns and Kedia (2006), Peng and Röell (2008), and Johnson Ryan and Tian (2008).”
Corporate Governance and Firm-Specific Stock Price Crashes (2016, positive): “This incentive is argued to be more powerful for their option holdings relative to their stock holdings [Burns and Kedia (2006); Benmelech et al. (2010)].”
Hometown advantage: The effects of monitoring institution location on financial reporting discretion (2011, positive): “We use three years because Burns and Kedia (2006) find that the time lapse between the misstated year and the restatement announcement year is 2.4 years for 75% of the firms.”
6 Pay and Performance: Individuals, Groups, and Executives (2009, background): “Other research finds that financial statement restatement, or “misreporting”, is predicted by the pay–performance sensitivity of stock options, but not the sensitivity of other types of pay, including restricted stock or other long‐term incentives (Burns & Kedia, 2006 ).”
How pervasive is corporate fraud? (2013, neutral): “Burns and Kedia (2006), Efendi, Srivastava and Swanson (2007)).”
Incentives to Inflate Reported Cash from Operations Using Classification and Timing (2012, background): “27 Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) find that restating firm-years have higher accruals than non-restating firm-years, but Burns and Kedia (2006) find no difference in the discretionary accruals of restating firmyears and those of non-restating firm-years.”