A theory of sequential reciprocity

By Martin A. Dufwenberg, Georg Kirchsteiger. Games Econ. Behav., 2004

2,066 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: General Decision Sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/67973da005dc30b5f42c08111fc34d61d55cf095

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Citations in the corpus

Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion (2009, positive): “(1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) , and Charness and Rabin (2002).”
How is Donation Behaviour Affected by the Donations of Others (2008, background): “Various theories of pro-social behaviour have been developed to help to explain charitable donations and voluntary contributions to public goods (Becker, 1974; Margolis, 1982; Sugden, 1984; Andreoni, 1990; Rabin, 1993; Bernheim, 1994; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004).”
A Survey of Economic Theories and Field Evidence on Pro-Social Behavior (2006, neutral): “ We talk of reciprocity when individuals act in a pro‐social manner in response to the friendly behavior of others and in a hostile way in response to unfriendly behavior (Rabin 1993; Falk and Fischbacher 2001; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004).”
Identifying cooperative behavior: some experimental results in a prisoner's dilemma game (2002, background): “Various divergent theoretical explanations have been proposed, including “pure” as well as “warm glow” altruism (Andreoni, 1993; Andreoni and Miller, 1995; Offerman et al., 1996), the relative payoff position of individuals (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), “cooperative gain seek”
Contractual and Organizational Structure with Reciprocal Agents (2008, methodology): “In particular we will employ “reciprocity”, a concept formally described by Rabin (1993) for normal form games and by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) for sequential games.3 For many games reciprocity-type models have been awkward to apply; part of the reason why…”
Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility (2008, neutral): “We consider the motives inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) and reciprocity (Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).”
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model (2004, background): “…preferences, as in e.g. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Levine (1998), Falk and Fischbacher (1999), Charness and Rabin (2002), Cox and Friedman (2002) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), are not able to also rationalize the data.14 A main reason for applying inequity aversion is tractability.”
Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009, background): “In recent work, Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a signaling model that provides an alternative theory for explaining greater generosity to friends under non-anonymity.”
It's all about Connections: Evidence on Network Formation (2012, positive): “, Rabin (1993), Falk and Fischbacher (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Charness and Rabin (2002). While most models yield similar predictions, we use the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) since it is relatively simple.”
Reputation management: Why and how gossip enhances generosity (2016, background): “For example, the theory of sequential reciprocity suggests that a person's ability to estimate the payoff in a situation is informed by beliefs of others' choices (Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004).”
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, background): “However, the problem in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) arises with more than”
Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy (2007, neutral): “Rabin, 2002, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006).”
Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games (2003, background): “The models inMcCabe and Smith (2000), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998), Falk and Fischbacher (1998), for example, fall within the class of intention-based accounts.”