Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior

By J. Doris. 2002

738 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Social Psychology, Philosophy

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c9e56db916c593c06ffa09f60d0d8c6f06a0e2d6

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Citations in the corpus

The Science of Wisdom in a Polarized World: Knowns and Unknowns (2020, background): “Philosophical claims about wisdom and other virtues typically involve the assumption of cross-situational reliability (Alfano, 2012; Doris, 2002; Miller, 2017).”
VIRTUE-BASED MEASUREMENT OF ETHICAL LEADERSHIP: THE LEADERSHIP VIRTUES QUESTIONNAIRE (2010, background): “Social psychology emphasizes the power of the situation in overriding characterological factors (e.g., Doris, 2002; see also Price, 2008, Ch. 4, for an overview).”
Wise Reasoning in the Face of Everyday Life Challenges (2016, background): “Some behavioral scientists have interpreted this statement as meaning that wisdom is a stable disposition (cf. Doris, 2002), inferring that it might be sufficient to assess wisdom-related tendencies via single-shot measure of behavior (e.g., in the laboratory) or via generalized trait…”
The dynamic moral self: A social psychological perspective. (2009, background): “Whereas some authors have pitted situational forces against moral character (e.g., Doris, 2002), we see the two as intricately related: Moral self-regard is by definition sensitive to situational demands, and conversely when situations do influence behavior, they often do so by affecting moral…”
Situational Strategies for Self-Control (2016, background): “Indeed, how we voluntarily select and modify our situations may ultimately explain more variance in our behavior than how, once in the grips of situational forces, we navigate them (Doris, 2002).”
Virtuous states and virtuous traits: How the empirical evidence regarding the existence of broad traits saves virtue ethics from the situationist critique (2014, background): “…one major contemporary objection to the study of virtue ethics is that the empirical psychological evidence demonstrates that traits have little to no meaningful impact on behavior, thus rendering any talk of virtue and character fruitless (Doris, 1998, 2002; Harman, 1999; Vranas, 2005, 2009).”
A History of Implicit Social Cognition Where Is It Coming From? Where Is It Now? Where Is It Going? (2010, background): “Contemporary philosophers have recently begun integrating insights from implicit social cognition with theories of ethics, creating an exciting exchange of ideas across disciplines (e.g., Appiah, 2008; Doris, 2002; Kennett & Fine, 2009).”
Character: The Prospects for a Personality-Based Perspective on Morality (2014, background): “As one illustration, a recent group of philosophers has interpreted research in the social and personality psychology literature as evidence against the existence of broad character traits, thus rendering their study pointless (Doris, 1998, 2002; Harman, 1999).”
Moral character predominates in person perception and evaluation. (2014, neutral): “…more broadly, has been of considerable recent interest to both psychologists (see, e.g., Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Walker & Hennig, 2004; Walker & Pitts, 1998) and philosophers (see, e.g., Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Kupperman, 1991; Miller, 2003, 2009, 2010, 2013a, 2013b).”
No Character or Personality (2003, background): “Doris’ (2002) defense of the fragmentation of character, derided by Solomon, is so widely accepted by social psychologists that a similar account can be found in any introductory textbook in social psychology.”
Ethically adrift: How others pull our moral compass from true North, and how we can fix it (2013, background): “This explanation for ethical drift harkens back to Aristotelian notions of human virtue and persists in contemporary discussions of character as the foundation of morality (cf., Doris, 2002).”