Firm‐Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines

By Marc Knez, Duncan Simester. Journal of Labor Economics, 2001

419 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c84c1912636c9706d287f2662fd8b44b5036c60d

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Citations in the corpus

When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, neutral): “…in microeconomics).17 Notwithstanding frequent appeals to real-world problems (e.g., Knez and Camerer, 1994, Camerer and Knez, 1996; Knez and Simester, 2001; Weber et al., 2001; Weber, 2005; Brandts and Cooper, 2004, 2005, 2005a; Chaudhuri, Schotter, and Sopher, 2005; for a laudable…”
Social Incentives in the Workplace (2010, background): “…in place cause there to be an externality of worker’s effort on the pay of their co-workers, such as relative performance evaluation (Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul, 2005) or team pay (Jones and Kato, 1995; Knez and Simester, 2001; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003).”
Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter-Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice (2009, positive): “1 Knez and Simester (2001) provide an insightful account about how successful resolution of coordination”
Human Resource Management and Productivity (2010, positive): “Thus it may discourage some high ability (but risk averse) workers from joining the firm and encourage excessive 14 Knez and Simester (2001) also found productivity increases following the promise of a company-wide bonus for improvements in on-time takeoffs in Continental Airways.”
Do Directors Perform for Pay (2008, positive): “Our paper complements previous studies that have found that the provision of financial incentives in firms affect performance (e.g. Lazear, 2000; Knez and Simester, 2001; see Prendergast, 1999, for a survey) in several ways.”
Lab Labor: What can Labor Economists Learn from the Lab? (2010, background): “…studies of the effects of changes in compensation policy, which have focused on stadium vendors (Oettinger 1999), Continental Airlines employees (Knez and Simester 2001), textile workers (Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan 2003), steel minimill workers (Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw 2007), and taxi…”
The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity: Cooperation in Heterogeneous Populations (2004, background): “Group incentives for large work teams are often effective motivators even when the opportunity for reciprocation is absent and the benefits of cooperation are so widely shared that a self-interested group member would gain from free-riding on the effort of others (Ghemawat, 1995; Hansen, 1997; Knez ”
Social Incentives in Organizations (2018, background): “In a case study of profit sharing at Continental Airlines, Knez and Simester (2001) argue that the relevant in-group is the team of workers at the same airport, and that the introduction of a profit sharing scheme improved performance because workers internalized the effect on the pay of their immed”
Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental Study (2007, background): “For example, company-wide sharing of gains may be important in providing high motivation for some workplaces – especially those relying on intrinsic motivation and groupbased production – Levine (1995); Knez and Simester (2001).”
The Impact of Gender Diversity on the Performance of Business Teams: Evidence from a Field Experiment (2011, background): “Mutual monitoring may be particularly e ective in the case of large teams of people who don't know each other (Knez and Simester, 2001; Hamilton et al., 2003) or for rms with weak corporate governance, thereby suggesting that gender-diverse boards could act as a substitute mechanism for corporate…”
Social Norms and Economic Incentives in Firms (2012, background): “Knez and Simester (2001) provide evidence for the airline industry, and Ichino and Maggi (2000) for 2See e.g. Akerlof (1980), Moffitt (1983), Besley and Coate (1992), Bernheim (1994), Lindbeck, Nyberg andWeibull (1999, 2003), Hart (2001), Kübler (2001), and Vendrick (2003) and the literature cited…”
The Principal's Moral Hazard: Constraints on the Use of Incentives in Hierarchy (2006, background): “5 We do not want to overdo the distinction between public agencies and firms, although there is evidence that the use of ownership schemes has increased in the private sector in recent decades (Conte and Kruse 1991; Jones and Kato 1995; Knez and Simester 2001).”