The Effects of Parental Altruism on the Governance of Family-Managed Firms

By M. Lubatkin, W. Schulze, Yan Ling, Richard N. Dino. 2005

645 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c803fc7c3684bbc808d4f5c8628ae79cb1fd3ea3

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

Socioemotional Wealth and Earnings Management in Private Family Firms (2010, background): “Therefore, although in founder-led family firms a shared vision increases the willingness of family members to subordinate their individual goals to collective goals (Mustakallio, Autio, & Zahra, 2002), in descendant-led family firms each family member starts to place the needs and immediate demands”
Parent–Child Relationships: Planting the Seeds of Deviant Behavior in the Family Firm (2012, background): “…to their children than children are to their parents, (2) parents act as firm leaders and control resources thus giving them the capacity to be generous to children, and (3) altruism can hamper a parent’s ability to monitor and discipline their children (Chua et al.; Lubatkin et al., 2005).”
Home country institutions and the internationalization of state owned enterprises: A cross-country analysis (2016, background): “Then it is subject to political as well as business interests, potentially faces principal-principal conflicts (Lubatkin et al., 2005; Young et al., 2008), and is likely 1 We use this abbreviation strictly for wholly privately owned firms, namely firms without any state entity as an investor. to…”
Exploring the relation between family involvement and firms' financial performance: A meta-analysis of main and moderator effects (2012, background): “…2000; Schack, 2001), lack of incentive to share wealth (Burkart et al., 1997; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2000), nepotism (Pollack, 1985), free-riding (Schulze et al., 2003), adverse selection (Lubatkin et al., 2005), and the consumption of unearned perks (Chrisman et al., 2004; Schulze et al., 2001).”
Understanding the Innovation Behavior of Family Firms* (2015, background): “These problems make it difficult for family firms to recruit, reward, and monitor their managers effectively (Lubatkin et al. 2005), which results in a shortage of qualified managerial talent.”
Accessing Resources from Innovation Partners: The Search Breadth of Family SMEs (2012, background): “Nepotistic promotion and employment decisions concerning family members lead to negative consequences for family-controlled businesses (Lubatkin et al. 2005) such as limited”
CEO Compensation in Private Family Firms (2013, background): “In case of a nonfamily CEO, significant agency costs are expected to prevail (Lubatkin et al., 2005).”
Firm Philanthropy in Small- and Medium-Sized Family Firms (2014, neutral): “Philanthropy demands resources that are not attributed to the family, and a small decision-making group may feel less confident in undertaking philanthropic initiatives (e.g., Chirico et al., 2011; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2005).”
Ability and Willingness as Sufficiency Conditions for Family‐Oriented Particularistic Behavior: Implications for Theory and Empirical Studies (2014, background): “…value of ownership (Astrachan and Jaskiewicz 2008; Zellweger and Astrachan 2008); emphasize the creation and conservation of socioemotional wealth for the family (Gómez-Mejía et al. 2007); and act altruistically toward family members (Lubatkin et al. 2005; Schulze, Lubatkin, and Dino 2003b).”