The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

By V. Cuñat, M. Giné, Maria Guadalupe. 2010

389 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c31e15c8ec8c5410a120d1f33fda78eaa4f85c1c

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Citations in the corpus

The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016, positive): “8 In an RD setting, Cuñat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) (2014) …nd that relative to proposals that fail by a small margin, proposals that pass by a small margin yield an abnormal return between 1.3% and 2.4%, depending on the proposal type.”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (2015, positive): “S. firms, the possible inclusion of some nonbinding votes may not matter given prior work showing that advisory-only votes can impact firm outcomes (see, e.g., Cunat, Gine, and Guadalupe 2012; Ertimur, Ferri, and Muslu 2011; Ferri and Maber 2013).”
Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity (2017, methodology): “In column (7), we use the dynamic RDD specification of Cuñat et al. (2012) to examine the abnormal returns beyond the day of the vote.”
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters (2015, neutral): “Related papers in this vein include Matvos and Ostroevsky (2010) and Davis and Kim (2007), who examine the management friendliness of funds and the fund-firm business ties, respectively.”
Shareholder Democracy in Play: Career Consequences of Proxy Contests (2014, methodology): “To address this concern, we include polynomials in the measure of closeness of voting outcome, interacted with the Lostseat indicator (Cunat et al., 2012).”
A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value (2013, methodology): “In addition, the findings supplement research linking corporate culture and firm value (Edmans (2011); Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2013)) and provide empirical support for theories of the firm focused on the intangible assets and employees (Goel and Thakor (2008); Carlin and Gervais (2009); Berk”
The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, positive): “Nonetheless, Cuñat et al. (2012) find evidence of a positive stock price reaction to the passage of a proposal, with stronger results when the analysis focuses on proposals related to shareholder rights of the kind examined by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). Listokin (2009) uses RDD to examine t”
Peer Effects of Corporate Social Responsibility (2019, neutral): “(2011), Dhaliwal et al. (2011), Albuquerque, Durnev, and Koskinen (2014)), more positive sellside analysts’ recommendations (e.”
Effect of Board Size and Duality on Corporate Social Responsibility: What has Improved in Corporate Governance in Asia? (2019, background): “The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions (Cuñat et al. (2012) .”