Are Mutual Funds Active Voters

By Peter Iliev, Michelle René Lowry. 2015

277 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f6a6833c128bbeabe51592fd2867b08862837903

Citations in the corpus

• Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership (2018, unknown): “Funds with higher costs and lower benefits of implementing own corporate governance initiatives are more likely to vote with ISS recommendations (Iliev and Lowry, 2012).”
• The Role of Proxy Advisory Firms: Evidence from a Regression-Discontinuity Design (2016, unknown): “To assess causality, Iliev and Lowry (2015), Ertimur, Ferri, and Oesch (2013), and Larcker, McCall, and Ormazabal (2015) show that the sensitivity to ISS recommendations is stronger for shareholders that are smaller and have higher turnover, consistent with such shareholders having weaker…”
• Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay (2013, unknown): “PA recommendations more often when the funds hold a large stake in the portfolio firm and have greater incentives to perform their own research (Iliev and Lowry, 2012; Schouten, 2012).”