Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy
By C. Fee, Charlie Hadlock. 2004
404 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c0a303875109ec96e23b5385cbacdd1dc6c6ac77
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Scott Schaefer
- Paul D. Oyer
- Florian S. Peters
- Alexander F. Wagner
- Rachel M. Hayes
- Gennaro Bernile
- Hemang Desai
- Chris E. Hogan
In Economics and Econometrics
- Scott Schaefer
- Paul D. Oyer
- Rachel M. Hayes
- Gennaro Bernile
- Hemang Desai
- Florian S. Peters
- Chris E. Hogan
- Michael S. Wilkins
Citations in the corpus
- CEOs Under Fire: The Effects of Competition from Inside Directors on Forced CEO Turnover and CEO Compensation (2013, background): “…Hurd and the appointment of an outside successor, several top executives also left the firm, perhaps due to their association with the ousted CEO (Fee and Hadlock (2004), Helmich and Brown (1972), Helmich (1974), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003)), but one executive, Ann Livermore, also…”
- Managerial Turnover in a Changing World (2012, neutral): “k=t+1 k J t+1 s; ~ k >t+1 0( k( ; s; ~ k >t+1)) (3)75 ds (9)”
- Coworker Complementarity and the Stability of Top-Management Teams (2005, methodology): “The three studies most comparable to ours are Helmich and Brown (1972), Wruck and Wruck (2002), and Fee and Hadlock (2004).”
- The Executive Turnover Risk Premium (2014, background): “Conditional on finding a subsequent job, a 20%-75% decrease in pay appears realistic in light of the empirical evidence in Fee and Hadlock (2004).7 Finally, we vary the one-year forced turnover probability, p, in a range of 1% to 10%.”
- The Reputational Penalty for Aggressive Accounting: Earnings Restatements and Management Turnover (2004, positive): “5 percent rehire rate reported by Fee and Hadlock (2004) for S&P 500 executives who departed their firms around a scandal and were able to obtain a job with an executive rank at another public firm.”
- Earnings Restatements, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the Disciplining of Chief Financial Officers (2009, neutral): “Fee and Hadlock (2004) document that dismissed executives are less likely to make lateral moves upon leaving their firms and are more likely to accept subsequent employment in inferior positions relative to their previous employment. Desai, Hogan, and Wilkins (2006) find that executives terminated f”