Intuitive and deliberate judgments are based on common principles.

By Arie W. Kruglanski, Gerd Gigerenzer. Psychology Review, 2011

721 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Developmental and Educational Psychology, General Decision Sciences

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c07be55351894119d625a4c742e0ba80fc464972

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Citations in the corpus

Opening up Openness to Experience: A Four-Factor Model and Relations to Creative Achievement in the Arts and Sciences. (2013, neutral): “…& Fioratou, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005; Lieberman, 2003, 2007; Lin & Lien, 2013; Stanovich, 2004, 2009, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Kaufman, 2009a, 2011—but also see Keren and Schul (2009), Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011), and Osman (2004)).”
Measuring Risk Literacy: The Berlin Numeracy Test (2012, background): “…framework, the framework suffers from theoretical and conceptual under-speciﬁcation and inconsistency, and as a result lacks predictive validity (Cokely, 2009; Keren & Schul, 2010; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Gigerenzer & Regier, 1996; Osman, 2004; Newell, 1973; Reyna et al., 2009).”
Dual Process Th eories (2013, background): “New York: Oxford University Press. criticized for not providing sound criteria for the identification of whether the process underlying observed relations between environmental inputs and behavioral outputs is associative or rule-based (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Moors, 2014).”
The shifting sands of creative thinking: Connections to dual-process theory (2014, background): “…process accounts, including that the range of features ascribed to each type of thinking process are imperfectly aligned to each other and the overarching processes (Keren & Schul, 2009) and that an alternative rule-based, unisystem model can explain human judgement (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).”
Heuristics: Tools for an Uncertain World (2015, background): “…can be applied both consciously or unconsciously and prefer testable process models of heuristics to opaque descriptions that tend to exhaust themselves in long lists of dichotomies, we prefer to abstain from such characterizations (see Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011 for a critical review).”
Defining features versus incidental correlates of Type 1 and Type 2 processing (2012, background): “Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011) most recently created such a straw man with their claim that dual-process views fail because ‘‘these dimensions are unaligned rather than aligned’’ (p. 98).”
The complexity of developmental predictions from dual process models (2011, background): “And in parallel, they also have received a sizable share of criticism (Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011; Osman, 2004).”
Cognitive Bias Modification and Cognitive Control Training in Addiction and Related Psychopathology (2013, background): “This does not appear to be the case—for instance, automatic processes may require attentional resources or be efficient but still dependent on intentions (Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).”
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition (2013, neutral): “Critics (see especially Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) do, indeed, talk as though all correlated features of dual processes discussed by theorists must be necessarily and invariably observed together and that any observed counterexample will provide a falsification of (apparently) any dual-process…”
Questions and challenges for the new psychology of reasoning (2012, background): “The tendency to refer to dual-process theory (singular) is a gift to critics (e.g., Keren & Schul, 2009; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011) who like to point to weaknesses or ambiguities in some accounts as a reason to discredit the whole movement.”
The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values (2014, background): “…is important in determining behaviour (e.g., Evans, 2009; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Stanovich, 2004), others have downplayed analytic reasoning, choosing instead to focus on the simple heuristics that are used when making judgements (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Gigerenzer, 2007; Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011).”