A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk

By Vincent P. Crawford. 1998

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Citations in the corpus

Multi-Agent Cooperation and the Emergence of (Natural) Language (2016, methodology): “These games have been used as models to study the evolution of language both theoretically and experimentally (Crawford, 1998; Blume et al., 1998; Crawford & Sobel, 1982).”
The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (2007, unknown): “We experimentally investigate the effects of costless pre-play communication, or cheap talk, in symmetric coordination games of the stag hunt variety [11] [12] [13] [14] [15].”
How Much Collusion? A Meta-Analysis on Oligopoly Experiments (2006, unknown): “In game theoretic terms, competition puts sellers into a prisoner's dilemma.11 If they have a chance to talk before play, from a theoretical perspective this is just irrelevant “cheap talk“ (for background and alternative models see Crawford 1998).”
Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions (2003, background): “All that remains is to identify the strategy combinations in Figure 2 that are equilibria for some parameter configurations, use these conditions to check which configurations make them sequential, and check the other conclusions of the lemma.”
Rankings and Risk-Taking in the Finance Industry (2018, unknown): “…distinctions in many areas of finance.3 More informally, financial professionals (henceforth, professionals) often compare themselves with others in discussions about their investments and successes (“cheap talk”; see Crawford (1998)), effectively ranking each other on an ongoing basis.”
Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion – The Impact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments (2012, unknown): “This reluctance to start punishment phases seems reasonable since n ≥ 4 firms find it difficult to move back to higher states (see Table 3).(19) Here is another example, with n > 2 firms.”
Cheap talk in bargaining experiments: lying and threats in ultimatum games (2003, background): “Most of the previous experiments on the effects of cheap talk have focused on its impact in coordination games (see Crawford, 1998 for an excellent review).”
Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games (2006, background): “, Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), Ho et al. (1998), Costa-Gomes et al.”
Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation (2002, background): “Kroll et al. (1999) also found that two-way cheap talk did not recapture efficiency losses in an interconnected game (see Crawford, 1998).”
The Aversion to Lying (2009, background): “Experimental evidence firmly rejects that communication is just cheap talk (see the overviews of experimental results in Ledyard 1995; Crawford 1998; and Camerer 2003).”