The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria

By A. Blume, Andreas Ortmann. Journal of Economics Theory, 2007

343 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion (2009, positive): “Communication dramatically increases the likelihood of coordination on an efficient equilibrium (Cooper et al. 1992; Blume and Ortmann 2007; Brandts and Cooper 2007).”
Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (2016, background): “, Blume and Ortmann ( 2007 ) , Cooper et al .”
When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory (2007, positive): “Several other experimenters – in baseline treatments for various modifications reported in those papers -- replicated this unraveling result with the same payoff matrix, and with subject numbers varying from 6 – 14 (e.g., Cachon and Camerer, 1996; Bornstein, Gneezy and Nagel, 2002; Blume and Ortmann”
Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games (2010, neutral): “Blume and Ortmann (2007) found that the average effort selected is 5 (out of 7) in the first round and 6 in later rounds. coordination games (Bednar et al., 2010).”
Words, Deeds, and Lies: Strategic Behaviour in Games with Multiple Signals (2006, background): “(1999), and Blume and Ortmann (1999). See also Crawford (1998) for a survey of experiments involving cheap talk.”