Managerial Attributes and Executive Compensation

By John R. Graham, Si Li, Jiaping Qiu. 2011

586 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/91b3cfaa923cad5861281f5087fec30a46ff697d

Citations in the corpus

• Measuring Firm Size in Empirical Corporate Finance (2018, unknown): “Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) use the log of assets as firm size proxy.”
• Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, unknown): “…concern that the change in peer selection biases might be driven by the change of our sample firms, we restrict our sample to firms that disclosed the names of their compensation peers in each of the four years; we also look at firms with the same CEO in all four years (Graham, Li, and Qiu 2012).”
• Peer Choice in CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “The detailed estimation is provided in Graham et al., Appendix B. We follow Graham et al. (2011) closely in the implementation of the AKM method and”
• CEO Materialism and Corporate Social Responsibility (2016, unknown): “We follow the approach in AKM which has been used in recent studies (Graham et al. 2012; Albuquerque et al. 2012).”
• Corporate governance and earnings management in concentrated markets (2020, unknown): “Consequently, the sample is expected to be heterogeneous (Graham et al., 2012).”
• Managerial Ability and Income Smoothing (2019, unknown): “5 However, high ability managers have more to lose in terms of compensation (Falato, Li, and Milbourn 2012; Graham, Li, and Qiu 2012) and reputation (Fudenberg and Tirole 1995) if unexpected negative shocks in the future lead to a poor mapping of current earnings to future earnings realizations.”
• Retail Financial Advice: Does One Size Fit All? (2015, unknown): “Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) and Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) extend this estimation strategy to draw inferences also about “non-movers’” fixed effects in studies that separate firm and employee effects on wages and disentangle the roles that firm and manager effects play in executive…”
• What’s in an education? Implications of CEO education for bank performance (2016, unknown): “Consistent with suggestions that shareholders’ willingly pay a premium to attract top talent, Graham et al. (2012) document that higher educational attainment in CEOs is rewarded with greater compensation, observed through higher manager fixed-effects for CEO compensation.”