Folk Psychology as Simulation

By R. Gordon. 1986

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Citations in the corpus

Machine Theory of Mind (2018, background): “While we may also, in some cases, leverage our own minds to simulate others’ (e.g. Gordon, 1986; Gallese & Goldman, 1998), our ultimate human understanding of other agents is not measured by a 1-1 correspondence between our models and the mechanistic ground truth, but instead by how much these…”
The function of folk psychology: mind reading or mind shaping? (2008, background): “The earliest arguments for simulation theory appealed to the impracticality of using appropriately hedged laws to predict behavior in real-world contexts (Gordon 1995 , 67; Goldman 1995 , 79).”
Logical and Phenomenological Arguments Against Simulation Theory (2007, background): “In the same way, when I am asked whether my neighbor believes the car is red, I look at the car from her first-person perspective ( Gordon 1995a, b). I settle the question of whether the other person believes P by asking, within the framework of the simulation, whether it is the case that P. I conc”
Attention to behavioral events during interaction: two actor-observer gaps and three attempts to close them. (2001, background): “, 1997), others argue for a sort of projection of one’s own real or imagined states onto the other person (Goldman, 1989; Gordon, 1986; Harris, 1992), perhaps using a set of transformation rules (Karniol, 1986).”
Toward a More Robust Theory and Measure of Social Presence: Review and Suggested Criteria (2003, background): “The psychological questions of social presence may be part of the larger issue of the “theory of mind” or how individuals have “knowledge of other minds,” or, more specifically, infer intentional states to others (Gordon, 1986; Carruthers & Smith, 1996; Premack & Premack, 1996).”
The Effect of the Agency and Anthropomorphism on Users' Sense of Telepresence, Copresence, and Social Presence in Virtual Environments (2003, methodology): “2 This is consistent with both the argument that people’s model of the other’s mind is based on a generalization from one’s own mind (Gordon, 1986) as well as Walter’s 1996 ﬁnding that users were more likely to believe that others were “like them” in low bandwidth systems than in high bandwidth…”
Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2003, background): “On the cognitive side, there are those who favor “theory theory” (e.g., Baron-Cohen 1995; Leslie 2000), and those who champion the simulation approach (e.g., Gordon 1986, 1995a; Goldman 1989).”
The duality of mind: an historical perspective (2009, background): “Others argue that our skill at everyday psychological prediction derives from an ability to run mental simulations of each other, rather than from a knowledge of theoretical principles (e.g. Goldman 1989; Gordon 1986; Heal 1986).”
The cognitive functions of language (2002, background): “There may be a more general point here, which gives the element of truth in so-called “simulationist” theories of our mind-reading abilities (Goldman 1989; 1993; Gordon 1986; 1995; Heal 1986; 1995).”
Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition. (2005, background): “In philosophy ST has been endorsed by Currie & Ravenscroft (2002), Goldman (1989, 1992a, 1992b, 2000), Gordon (1986, 1992, 1996), and Heal (1986, 1996, 1998), whereas TT has been defended as an explicit approach to the execution of mindreading by Fodor (1992), Nichols, Stich, Leslie & Klein (1996),…”
Précis of Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading (2006, methodology): “1989), in the wake of papers by Robert Gordon (1986) and Jane Heal (1986).”
A Moderate Approach to Embodied Cognitive Science (2012, background): “…approach to mindreading, characteristic attempts to read another person's mind are executed by running a simulation of the target in one's own mind and seeing what mental state emerges (Gordon 1986; Goldman, 1986, 1989, 2006; Gallese and Goldman 1998; Heal 1986; Currie and Ravenscroft 2002).”
The functional architecture of human empathy. (2004, methodology): “…is compatible with the simulation theory, which states that we ordinarily understand and predict the behavior and mental states of others by simulation—that is, by using our own mental resources off-line as if we were in the situation of the other (Goldman, 1989; Gordon, 1986; Harris, 1991, 2000).”