Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function

By Jose M. Arau. 2002

1,282 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afcf50d674e73849169255de582863b9dd4c1c14

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK (2005, positive): “Recent exceptions include Kathuria and Mueller (1995), Hadlock (1998), and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), for the US, Gugler (2003) for Austria, Haid and Weigand (2001) for Germany, Degryse and de Jong (2000) for the Netherlands, Pindado and de la Torre (2004) for Spain, and Goergen and Renneboog (2001”
Modelling the Firm in its Market and Organizational Environment: Methodologies for Studying Corporate Social Responsibility (2006, positive): “Jensen (2001), cited here as a major advocate of principal–agent theory, has a distinctive position on these issues.”
Socially Responsible Firms and Endogenous Choice of Strategic Incentives (2012, neutral): “Therefore, it is argued, it is not the firm’s 1On the debate about the stakeholder versus shareholder view of the firm, see Jensen (2001), Sundaram and Inkpen (2004), Freeman et al. (2004), Hillman and Keim (2001), Jones (1995).”
Corporate Social Responsibility: Is it Rewarded by the Corporate Bond Market? A Critical Note (2010, positive): “According to the traditional principle of rationality, companies and their top managers should only pursue one objective under the shareholder value primacy, namely that of profit maximization (Jensen, 2001; Rappaport, 1986).”
Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China (2010, background): “…paper, we take the position that good corporate governance mechanisms, in terms of the characteristics of the board of directors and corporate ownership, should enhance the fairness among the different stakeholders in the business (Collier and Esteban, 1999; Jensen, 2005; Matten and Crane, 2005).”
Stakeholder welfare and firm value (2010, positive): “Some scholars (e.g., Zingales, 2000; Jensen, 2001) view stakeholder welfare as investments in value-creating intangibles such as reputation and human capital.”
Corporate donations and shareholder value (2017, neutral): “The agency hypothesis states that corporate philanthropy is the result of, or reflects, an agency problem between the manager and owners since managers (and directors) are likely to act in their own interests (Jensen, 2001).”
Sustainable Bonuses: Sign of Corporate Responsibility or Window Dressing? (2014, positive): “…broader, often long-term societal goals, with shareholder value (i.e. the financial return that a shareholder is able to obtain from his investment in a firm) being prioritised to the detriment of stakeholder interests (Guerrera, 2009a; Hahn et al., 2010; Lenssen et al., 2010; Jensen, 2001).”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Stakeholder Value Maximization: Evidence from Mergers (2013, positive): “more likely to contribute to firms’ long-term profitability and efficiency (Jensen, 2001; Jawahar and McLaughlin, 2001; Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar, 2004).”
Corporate Social Responsibility, Noise, and Stock Market Volatility (2012, background): “…on other core, value-creating business activities, such as new product development, the stakeholder orientation inherent in CSR may undermine the legitimate business objective of maximizing long-run economic value or profitability (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 1994, 2002; Levitt, 1958; Siegel, 2009).”