Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Agency Costs or Asymmetric Information? Evidence from the UK

By Grzegorz Pawlina, Luc Renneboog. 2005

267 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fc837d39dbc1f8c521dbc6c1ed8ac9fd32836e2d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Institutional Investment Horizon and Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity (2012, methodology): “First, in the spirit of Pawlina and Renneboog (2005), we use lagged measures of IIIH to mitigate simultaneity issues.”
What do we know about entrepreneurial finance and its relationship with growth? (2015, background): “A survey of related research concludes there is broad evidence of financial constraints on investment among firms most affected by information asymmetries/agency costs (e.g. smaller firms) in both developed and developing economies (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005).”
Control Structures and Payout Policy (2007, unknown): “Renneboog, 2001; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005), while the resulting suboptimal investment policy may harm the incumbent shareholders (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003).”
Family ownership, financing constraints and investment decisions (2011, unknown): “…and GMM-insystems) show insignificant coefficients for lagged investment, but confirm all other results, in particular with respect to significantly lower investment–cash flow sensitivities for family firms. ownership (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005) but extends the pattern to outside ownership.”
Working capital management, corporate performance, and financial constraints (2014, background): “Finally, there is a large and growing literature documenting the sensitivity of investment to cash flow (Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Guariglia, 2008; among others).”
The effects of financialization on investment: evidence from firm-level data for the UK (2018, background): “The mainstream investment literature argues that companies’ financing issues mainly derive from agency problems, and the development of financial markets can relax these constraints (Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Love, 2003; Pawlina and Renneboog, 2005; Love and Zicchino, 2006; Guariglia and Car”
Family control and investment–cash flow sensitivity: Empirical evidence from the Euro zone (2011, unknown): “This finding suggests that the moderating role of family control in the investment-cash flow relation is nonlinear, which is in line with previous studies that find that the nonlinearities of the ownership structure with respect to firm value also arise when either insider ownership or ownership con”