Can corporate governance deter management from manipulating earnings? Evidence from related-party sales transactions in China
By Agnes W. Y. Lo, Raymond M. K. Wong, Michael Firth. 2010
379 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aa5307d6dfd5a2044ac130836dd838d48b9a6090
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Citations in the corpus
- Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market (2012, background): “The argument is in line with Lo et al. (2010) who find that the quality of corporate governance is important in deterring the use of manipulated transfer prices in related-party sales transactions.”
- Corporate Governance, Islamic Governance and Earnings Management in Oman: A New Empirical Insights from a Behavioural Theoretical Framework (2017, neutral): “Despite these differences in CG arrangements around the world, existing studies have focused disproportionately on evaluating the effect of Anglo-American CG mechanisms on EM to the neglect of the others (Epps & Ismail, 2009; Ghosh et al., 2010; Lo et al., 2010; Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Alves, 2012”
- Tournament Incentives and Corporate Fraud (2015, background): “Our measure of tournament incentives, the CEO pay gap, will likely be related to corporate governance mechanisms at the firm level, and corporate governance mechanisms themselves may be related to corporate fraud (e.g. Chen et al., 2006; Lo, Wong, and Firth, 2010).”
- Value relevance, earnings management and corporate governance in China (2015, background): “…concludes that related-party transactions arewidely used to manipulate earnings for financial reporting (Aharony et al., 2010b; Jian and Wong, 2010; Lo et al., 2010a; Wong et al., 2015), and good corporate governance mechanisms could moderate the level of tunneling in China (Gao and Kling, 2008;…”