Sustainable Bonuses: Sign of Corporate Responsibility or Window Dressing?
137 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bae1fe1d3f4c602ccc345185546582895c930344
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In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Corporate Social Responsibility Performance, Incentives, and Learning Effects (2020, background): “(2016) and Kolk and Perego (2014), non-financial performance is generally more difficult to measure than financial performance.”
- Alignment Versus Monitoring: An Examination of the Effect of the CSR Committee and CSR-Linked Executive Compensation on CSR Performance (2021, background): “…that tying CEO compensation more strongly to CSR performance might bolster the latter (Eccles & Viviers, 2011; Hong et al., 2016; Li & Thibodeau, 2019), while others conclude on no relation between CSR-linked CEO compensation and CSR performance (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Kolk & Perego, 2014).”
- Sustainability reporting quality and post‐audit financial reporting quality: Empirical evidence from the UK (2020, background): “The inclusion of explicit social targets in an executive compensation scheme may lead to good sustainable performance (Kolk & Perego, 2014) and increase corporate social commitment (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Cordeiro & Sarkis, 2008), which is likely to affect firms' commitment to higher…”
- Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive Compensation Contribute to Corporate Social Performance? (2016, background): “In response to investors raising financial as well as social issues, showing their concern for the firms’ economic, social, and environmental performance firms seek to improve their CSP.”
- Tensions in Corporate Sustainability: Towards an Integrative Framework (2014, unknown): “Such compensation packages keep the importance of short-term earnings intact, but add complexity by also requiring managers to achieve non-financial objectives in line with demands from stakeholders other than investors (Kolk and Perego 2013).”