Conflicting Voices: The Effects of Institutional Ownership Heterogeneity and Internal Governance on Corporate Innovation Strategies

By R. Hoskisson, Michael A. Hitt, Richard A. Johnson, W. Grossman. 2002

981 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a8d77d469e9d7f70b2da71d67e31b27dc1e0c051

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In Management of Technology and Innovation

Citations in the corpus

Corporate governance practices and companies’ R&D intensity: Evidence from European countries (2015, background): “…empirical contributions have analysed the impact on R&D intensity of the degree of ownership concentration (Lee and O’Neil, 2003; Tribo et al., 2007), owner identity (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2008; Munari et al., 2010) or the role and composition of the board of directors (Kor, 2006).”
Does governmental venture capital spur invention and innovation? Evidence from young European biotech companies (2015, background): “On the other hand, the presence of a long-term investor like a GVC may increase the ability of an IVC-backed firm to pursue long-term innovation strategies (Hoskisson et al., 2002).”
The Impact of Stakeholder Orientation on Innovation: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2016, neutral): “…devices to encourage the pursuit of innovative activities within firms (e.g., Aghion and Tirole 1994, Balkin et al. 2000, Baysinger et al. 1991, David et al. 2001, Graves 1988, Hansen and Hill 1991, Hill and Snell 1988, Hoskisson et al. 2002, Kochhar and David 1996, Manso 2011, Zahra 1996).”
Toward a “theoretical toolbox” for sustainability research in marketing (2011, background): “However, when managers are faced with competing interests of principals their allegiance is divided and their ability to implement sustainability initiatives that may be unpopular with some investors is limited (Hoskisson et al. 2002).”
Internal and External Corporate Governance: An Interface between an Organization and its Environment (2010, methodology): “For example, using structural equation modelling, Hoskisson et al. (2002) show that largeblock shareholders help mitigate against poor strategy, such as diversification, evolving into poor performance, therefore decreasing the magnitude of restructuring.”
Ownership structures and R&D in Europe: the good institutional investors, the bad and ugly impatient shareholders (2013, background): “Agency theory should be partially amended to acknowledge that shareholders do not all have the same attitude to corporate innovation strategies (Hoskisson et al., 2002).”
Ownership structure, strategic controls and export intensity of foreign-invested firms in transition economies (2008, background): “To mitigate this risk of managerial incompetence – as opposed to self-serving behavior – foreign investors may use hands-on, direct involvement in the strategic decision-making process and limit executive decisions to a narrow range of technical tasks (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hoskisson et al., ”
Family Ownership and R&D Intensity in Small‐ and Medium‐Sized Firms (2015, background): “For instance, prior studies have shown that the ownership structure of a firm is likely to affect the organization’s innovation management efforts (Hoskisson et al., 2002; Kochhar and David, 1996) according to ownership type, which may differ with respect to investment horizons, risk aversion, diver”
Doing More with Less: Innovation Input and Output in Family Firms (2016, background): “…firms in pursuing their preferred investments), inside ownership (since inside ownership has been shown to affect the CEO ’ s goals and motivation [Hoskisson et al., 2002]), and percentage ownership of largest owner (since the number of ownership stakes might be anindicator for the family ’ s…”