Do Incentive Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation

By Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter. 2002

197 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a2a2db24e8f44ae4004f4583be0f36ed079a05cf

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective* (2006, background): “Towry 2005; Fehr and Gachter 2002; Tenbrunsel and Messick 1999).”
Fairness, Reciprocity, and Wage Rigidity (2004, unknown): “Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2001) and Fehr and Gächter (2002) compare experimental labor relations models imitating the no shirking model, as in Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl (1996), with labor relations models that depend for success solely on reciprocity or trust, as in Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and…”
Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right? (2008, result): “Consistent with this finding, several recent laboratory experiments suggest that the introduction of fines or minimum performance requirements can reduce performance (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006).”
Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research (2016, background): “(1996, 1997) and Fehr and Gächter (2002) further modify the basic experimental design of Fehr et al. (1993) so that in the first stage, the wage contract specifies a wage, a desired effort level and a fine for effort below the desired level.”
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories (2006, background): “Moreover, this increase in cooperation due to punishment opportunities can even be observed in one-shot experiments where the groups are randomly mixed in every period such that no subject ever interacts twice with another subject [Fehr and Gächter (2002)]. More recently, Gürerk, Irlenbusch and Rock”
Payments for Environmental Services and Motivation Crowding: Towards a Conceptual Framework (2019, background): “…have found intrinsic motivations to crowd out when incentives are introduced for activities that used to happen without such incentives, such as for collective activities (Ostrom, 2000; Houser et al., 2008; Bracht and Feltovich, 2008) and reciprocal behaviour (Fehr and Gachter, 1997; 2002).”
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, background): “Moreover, this increase in cooperation due to punishment opportunities can even be observed in one-shot experiments where the groups are randomly mixed in every period such that no subject ever interacts twice with another subject [Fehr and Gächter (2002)].”
Incentives and Prosocial Behavior (2006, background): “…contracting, subjects provided less effort when the contract specified fines for inadequate performance than when it did not (Fehr et al. (2001) and Fehr and Gächter (2002)) and they behaved much less generously when the principal had simply removed from their choice set the most selfish options…”
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOS (2004, unknown): “In this case we would expect to observe less trust and trustworthiness among CEOs in situations where trustworthiness requires non-selfish behavior.”
Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory (2008, unknown): “2000a, 2000b, Bohnet, Frey and Huck, 2001, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003, and Fehr and List, 2004).”