The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOS
By Ernst Fehr, John A. List. 2004
665 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81f3adcb8c2536e14c5bb505e45010be6bb2d456
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Demography
- Ernst Fehr
- Simon Gächter
- John A. List
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Armin Falk
- Magnus Johannesson
- Matthias Sutter
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
In Economics and Econometrics
- Armin Falk
- Ernst Fehr
- John A. List
- Simon Gächter
- Magnus Johannesson
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Matthias Sutter
- Steven D. Levitt
In Safety Research
- Ernst Fehr
- John A. List
- Simon Gächter
- Jeffrey P. Carpenter
- Armin Falk
- Matthias Sutter
- Ananish Chaudhuri
- Gary Charness
Citations in the corpus
- On the Economics and Biology of Trust (2009, background): “For example, in Fehr and List (2004), subjects (CEOs and students) in the role of an investor have the opportunity of combining a transfer in a modified trust game with a small credible sanction if the back-transfer does not meet the amount requested.”
- Trust games: A meta-analysis (2011, background): “Fehr and List (2004) as well as Falk, Meier, and Zehnder (2011) find evidence that their student subjects exhibit less trustworthiness than their non-student subjects in experimental studies of trust behavior.”
- Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students (2009, background): “9 The non-standard subject pools used include financial market traders (Alevy et al., 2006), sportscard dealers (List, 2003; Harrison and List, 2005), nurses (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Barr et al., 2004), CEOs (Fehr and List, 2004), managers in Chinese state-owned enterprises (Cooper et al., 1999), p”
- Trust, voluntary cooperation, and socio-economic background: survey and experimental evidence (2004, methodology): “For some recent laboratory trust game experiments using non-students, see Fehr and List (2002) , Holm and Nystedt (2003), Bahry et al. (2002), Bahry and Wilson (2004), and Sutter and Kocher (2004).”
- Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory (2008, neutral): “2000a, 2000b, Bohnet, Frey and Huck, 2001, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003, and Fehr and List, 2004).”
- Redesigning Teams and Incentives in a Merger: An Experiment with Managers and Students (2004, neutral): “undergraduates students and Fehr and List (2002) observe that CEO’s exhibit more trustful”
- The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment (2009, background): “However, there is a considerable body of evidence indicating that, when a potential punisher is present in a game, intrinsic motivations are crowded out ( Fehr and List 2004; Fehr and Rockenbach 2003).”
- Behavioural Development Economics: Lessons from Field Labs in the Developing World (2008, background): “Looking only at non-students, List (2004) finds that older people are more cooperative in the United States, as do Gaechter et al. (2004) in Russia and Carpenter et al.”