The Design of Bank Loan Contracts

By Gary B. Gorton, James A. Kahn. 2000

239 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a26c04fede656be1c7b982cc71848d78e39568d2

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Citations in the corpus

The theory of financial intermediation: An essay on what it does (not) explain (2003, background): “In loan contract design, it is the urge to be able to efficiently bargain in later (re)negotiations, rather than to fully assess current or expected default risk that structures the ultimate contract (Gorton and Kahn, 2000).”
Capital versus Performance Covenants in Debt Contracts (2012, unknown): “More recent theoretical literature views covenants as tripwires that give lenders an option to renegotiate loan terms by threatening default following a decline in economic performance (Berlin and Mester 1992; Rajan and Winton 1995; Gorton and Kahn 2000; Garleanu and Zwiebel 2009).”
How Collateral Laws Shape Lending and Sectoral Activity (2016, unknown): “1 King and Levine (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998), Taylor (1998), and Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) employ innovative statistical techniques to identify cross-country patterns. A later group of scholars—most notably Rajan and Zingales”
The Implications of Debt Heterogeneity for R&D Investment and Firm Performance (2008, unknown): “Furthermore, debt renegotiation is feasible for relational lenders because it requires agreement from a relatively small number of concentrated lenders (Gorton & Kahn, 2000).”
Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value (2012, background): “Creditor interference can exacerbate conflicts of interest between equity-holders and debt-holders, as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Gorton and Kahn (2000).”
Financial Contracting: A Survey of Empirical Research and Future Directions (2009, background): “(see also Gorton and Kahn (2000) and Garleanu and Zwiebel (2007)).”
Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements (2009, unknown): “For theories of security design, see studies by Berlin and Mester (1992), Rajan (1992), Gorton and Kahn (2000), and Garleanu and Zwiebel (2009).”
Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions (2005, unknown): “…through monitoring is too detailed to contract upon then the delegation of decision-making to the lender is optimal (Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993); banks are better able to perform Pareto-improving renegotiation than dispersed bond-holders (Berlin and Mester, 1992; Gorton and Kahn, 2000).”
Do Shareholder Rights Affect the Cost of Bank Loans (2009, unknown): “Myers (1977) and recently Strahan (1999), Gorton and Kahn (2000) and John, Lynch and Puri (2003) provide useful discussion of these factors.”
Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution (2020, background): “It is well known that giving the lender discretion to withdraw funds after a signal that the borrower has misbehaved can be beneficial (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Acharya et al., 2014; Gorton and Kahn, 2000).”
The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting (2015, unknown): “My data also enable me to investigate the implications of Gorton and Kahn (2000), who argue that interest rate changes in renegotiation reflect moral hazard potential, as opposed to credit risk.”