The Role of Dynamic Renegotiation and Asymmetric Information in Financial Contracting

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Bank Capital and Lending Relationships: Bank Capital and Lending Relationships (2017, positive): “While the Chava and Roberts (2008) link table allows me to merge the loan data with borrower characteristics, a similar table is not available for lenders.”
Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, positive): “Debt contract renegotiations are often triggered by the arrival of new information about the borrower or changes in macroeconomic conditions (Roberts and Sufi, 2009c, Roberts 2015).”
Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution (2020, background): “Since the largest firms have primarily long-term credit lines and term loans, the evidence in Table 4 confirms the active maturity management for large firms documented in Roberts (2015) and Mian and Santos (2018) .”
Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “The results show that financial covenant use increases by about 4% from the low to the medium category and decreases It should be noted that a substantial number of the observations in DealScan are renegotiations, rather than new loan originations (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b; Roberts, 2010).”