Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private Credit Agreements

By Michael R. Roberts, Amir Sufi. 2009

722 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/90968c0e2f79c6376e27e85662bdedb46734dc5e

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Citations in the corpus

Why Do Firms Form New Banking Relationships (2011, positive): “5International evidence on the benefits of close banking relationships is provided by Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990), Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Harhoff and Körting (1998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2003), Charumilind, Kali, and Wiwattanakantang (2006), and Park, Shin, and Ud”
Do Hedge Funds Trade on Private Information? Evidence from Syndicated Lending and Short-Selling (2011, background): “8 12 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the introduction of loan ratings opened the door for institutional investors such as hedge funds to enter the loan market which led to an increase in the availability of financing in the syndicated loan market (see, Mullineaux and Yi (2006) and Sufi (2009)). Nan”
Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (2010, neutral): “Finally, the paper is also related to the literature that empirically examines renegotiation (see Benmelech and Bergman (2008) and Roberts and Sufi (2009) in the context of corporate default, and Matvos (2009) for renegotiation in NFL football contracts).”
Friends with Money (2012, background): “…have investigated the role of covenants insofar as they relate to creditor intervention (Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009; Roberts and Sufi, 2009a), renegotiation (Roberts and Sufi, 2009b), and the sales of syndicates loans (Drucker and Puri, 2009; Gupta, Singh, and…”
The Supply-Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness (2012, background): “…facilities (Sufi 2009) to increased lender influence over the real and financial decisions of the firm ((Beneish and Press (1993), Chava and Roberts (2008), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2009a, 2009b), Roberts and Sufi (2009a)).1 What drives variation in the strictness of the equilibrium loan contract?”
The Private Equity Advantage: Leveraged Buyout Firms and Relationship Banking (2011, neutral): “Finally, while covenants may be renegotiated over the course of the loan’s term, total debt to cash flow is likely to be critical for a highly leveraged company, since it limits the amount of debt used to finance the initial transaction (Roberts and Sufi, 2008).”
Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008 (2010, background): “While this decrease in lending could result from the contraction in loan supply or demand, it is also possible that it stems from increase in loan maturity, the rate of refinancing (Roberts and Sufi, 2009), or both.”
Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management (2013, positive): “Technical default gives lenders the option of accelerating the loan repayment schedule, restricting the availability of credit, or modifying the cost of capital (Roberts and Sufi 2009; Sufi 2009).”