Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value
By Greg Nini, David C. Smith, Amir Sufi. 2012
723 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/aed4b8759efe65d32d9b29de12ec181a5c5eb836
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
- Valeri V. Nikolaev
- Hans B. Christensen
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- W. Guay
- Joseph P. Weber
- Peter R. Demerjian
- Jonathan H. Grenier
In Strategy and Management
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
- Hans B. Christensen
- W. Guay
- Joseph P. Weber
- Valeri V. Nikolaev
- Jonathan H. Grenier
- Ryan Casey
Citations in the corpus
- Why Do Loans Contain Covenants? Evidence from Lending Relationships (2017, neutral): “In practice, creditors rarely exercise this right (Nini et al., 2010).”
- Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management (2020, neutral): “Nini et al. (2012) show that firms that violate debt covenants, a clear sign of financial distress, immediately experience sharp declines in acquisitions and capital expenditures.”
- The Role of Information and Financial Reporting in Corporate Governance and Debt Contracting (2010, background): “Nini, Sufi, and Smith (2009) examine changes in firms’ corporate governance after covenant violations.”
- Accounting Information in Financial Contracting: The Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective (2016, positive): “Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) supplement this evidence by demonstrating that covenant violations also cause a sharp reduction in leverage and shareholder payouts, as well as an increase in CEO turnover.”
- Understanding and Contributing to the Enigma of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Assurance in the United States (2015, background): “Most assurance providers are currently using the AccountAbility 1000 (AA1000) and ISAE 3000 assurance standards (O’Dwyer and Owen 2005, 2007). 11 Interestingly, this result is solely attributable to the low demand in the shareholder-oriented U.S. Simnett et al. (2009) also predicted lower demand in ”
- Measuring the Probability of Financial Covenant Violation in Private Debt Contracts (2016, positive): “16 We end the sample in 2008 because we use actual covenant violation data from Nini et al. (2012) in our empirical analysis to calibrate our measure, and their data stop in 2008.”
- Household Leverage and the Recession of 2007 to 2009 (2010, neutral): “As of the fourth quarter of 2008, corporate defaults were much lower than during the years around the 2001 11 The covenant violation data are described in detail in Nini et al. (2009).”
- The Role of Bank Monitoring in Borrowers’ Discretionary Disclosure: Evidence from Covenant Violations (2014, neutral): “2 Covenant violation data I obtain covenant violation data from the database created by Nini et al. (2012), which”